Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

323. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, November 29, 1963, 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Call on the President by General Nasution

PARTICIPANTS

• Indonesia
  • General Abdul H. Nasution, Minister of Defense
  • Dr. Sudjarwo, Second Deputy Foreign Minister
  • Dr. Zairin Zain, Indonesian Ambassador to the U.S.
• United States
  • The President
  • Under Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman
  • Ambassador Howard P. Jones

The President greeted General Nasution cordially, said he knew President Sukarno well, having met him several times. He recalled that he had had luncheon with Sukarno at the executive mansion. He said he would never forget what Sukarno had said during one of his visits to Washington, that it was vital to ensure “that the free remain free”.

General Nasution outlined the purpose of his mission to the United States. He was, of course, representing President Sukarno at the funeral services for President Kennedy, and he expressed the deep condolences of his President and the Indonesian people over the tragic death of President Kennedy. He explained that his trip had been planned originally as an acceptance of General Taylor’s invitation to visit the United States and, particularly, to provide an opportunity for an exchange of views to achieve a better understanding between the leaders of the two nations. During the course of his conversations here, he had explained the Indonesian position on Malaysia and had discussed U. S. military aid to Indonesia, especially as related to the civic action program of the Indonesian military. He felt satisfied that an increase in mutual understanding had resulted from these discussions.

The President inquired as to whether the Malaysian dispute was being settled.

General Nasution replied that he saw no immediate prospect of a settlement. He said Indonesia would welcome a meeting of representatives of the three nations concerned to work out a formula for a settlement. But he pointed out that the Malaysian government had not been responsive to the desires of both the Philippines and Indonesia to start talking. Malaysia is insisting on prior conditions. He blamed the British for the basic difficulties which had originated when, in the midst of the United Nations survey of opinion in North Borneo to determine whether the people wanted to join Malaysia or not, the British had announced that Malaysia would be established September 16 whether the people of Borneo liked it or not. This had put Indonesia in an untenable position. There had been trouble over the observers as well as differences over the procedures which had been followed. In brief, neither the spirit nor the letter of agreements as to procedure reached at Manila had been adhered to and the Indonesian government could not accept the result. Nevertheless, the Indonesian government was always ready to meet to discuss differences with other Nations. The Foreign Minister had gone to the Colombo Plan meeting at Bangkok recently in the expectation of talking informally with the Foreign Minister of the Philippines and Malaysia. Unfortunately, the Malaysian Foreign Minister had left Bangkok as soon as he was informed that Dr. Subandrio of Indonesia would be coming. The Indonesian position now was that a tripartite meeting should be arranged as soon as possible, in accordance with the principles of Maphilindo.

The President told General Nasution that we had a great and continuing interest in Indonesia, and reminded him of our role in the West New Guinea settlement. He referred to the Indonesian military buildup on the Borneo border and the support to guerrillas and told General Nasution that we might be able to help if he could pull his troops off the border and stop supporting the guerrillas. The President expressed the strong hope that this military action would not go too far and made clear his disquiet at the situation.

General Nasution replied that the military buildup was defensive. He said that he had less than one-fourth the number of troops on the border that the British had on the other side. “I have one battalion, the British one brigade”, he said, pointing out that the latter were largely Gurkhas.

The President pointed out that this type of situation could become quite explosive and that this was not in the interest of Indonesia or the Free World. He urged that the three nations get together to solve this problem and expressed the hope that this could be one of the results following upon General Nasution’s visit to this country. The President said that a solution to this problem would enable us to help Indonesia more instead of less. He said he felt strongly that the Malaysian dispute was an Asian problem to be settled by those concerned but we were, of course, very much interested in seeing a solution develop. He told General Nasution that the policies of the United States Government toward Indonesia would continue unchanged.

Secretary Harriman pointed out that President Sukarno had felt a very special relationship existing between President Kennedy and himself.

The President said that he wanted President Sukarno to feel that the same friendship existed between himself and President Sukarno as had been true in the case of the late President, and he asked General Nasution to bear that message to President Sukarno.

The meeting concluded with a reiteration by the President of his conviction that a tripartite meeting should be held as soon as possible to explore the possibilities for a political settlement and that this settlement should be an Asian settlement worked out by representatives of the nations concerned.

General Nasution expressed his appreciation for the time the President had given him when he knew the extraordinary pressures under which the President was laboring in this difficult period.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL INDON–US. Drafted by Jones and approved by the White House on December 4 and in M on December 2. The meeting was held at the White House.