303. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
Indonesia
Mac Bundy tells me that you did not want to commit yourself to a visit to Indonesia in connection with any other trip you might make to [Page 663] the Far East.1 I would like the chance to argue this point with you. President Eisenhower made a mistake in 1958 which has cost the United States dearly. On a trip to the Philippines and Japan in that year, he excluded Indonesia, although previously the Indonesians had been allowed to believe that he would not neglect the largest country in Southeast Asia.
The memory of this refusal plus certain other mistaken actions which we took in the same period is still very strong in the minds of most Indonesians, and particularly in the mind of President Sukarno.
As you know, Indonesia is by far the largest and potentially the most powerful country in Southeast Asia. It has developed a sense of national unity—unusual in that area—and it is dominated by a man who is moved much more by personalities than by objective facts of international life and is peculiarly susceptible to political gestures. That the Soviet Bloc realizes the importance of personal visits is evidenced by the fact that since 1958 of the 20 VIP visits of Bloc officials to Indonesia, 6 were by chiefs of state or government. For these reasons a personal gesture from you to Sukarno would be worth multiples of millions of dollars of U.S. aid and should have a disproportionately large leverage effect on Indonesian policy.2
Unless the course of Indonesian policy swings more violently than we suspect, I should imagine that you would not omit a visit to that country on any Far Eastern visit you made, since to do so would be the strongest possible kind of signal from the United States that we were implacably opposed to Indonesia and her aspirations. If this is true, it seems to me that you lose nothing and perhaps gain a present advantage in making this intention explicit to Sukarno at this time. If between now [Page 664] and the time you actually decide on a visit to the Far East conditions have so changed as to make it inadvisable for you to go to Indonesia, you can always change your mind. The point is that a refusal to visit Indonesia after you have told Sukarno that you would, will be no stronger a rebuff to him than a failure to visit in the course of a trip to any other country in the Far East.
The advantage of making your intention to visit him explicit at this time is that it puts a mild restraint on Sukarno from upsetting any apple carts during the next 18 months.
Another thought that is in the back of my mind is that we may for many reasons decide that we cannot meet Indonesia’s expectations for a significant loan in connection with their stabilization program. Should this happen, the effect would be somewhat softened in Sukarno’s mind by a political gesture from you.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Indonesia, Vol. III, 3/63–4/63. Secret.↩
- In a February 19 memorandum to Komer, Forrestal asked Komer’s advice about a possible Presidential trip to Indonesia. Forrestal noted that it was “Jones’s thesis” that a visit and a friendly letter from President Kennedy would restrain Sukarno. Forrestal suggested that it could be argued that they might convince Sukarno that he could count on U.S. support “despite his grandiose schemes” and ambitions in North Borneo. (Ibid., 1/63–2/63) Komer responded in a memorandum to Forrestal that “I am with you 100%.” Komer agreed the President should write Sukarno to settle the visit issue, but also “we try to turn the Bung off while there is still time.” (Ibid., Meetings and Memoranda, Staff Memos, Komer, 1/63–2/63)↩
- On March 6, Kennedy sent Sukarno a letter thanking him for the renewed invitation to visit Indonesia. The President stated that before the end of his first term, he expected to pay a visit to the Far East, “and I assure you that I would not contemplate such a trip without visiting a country of the importance of Indonesia.” Kennedy also expressed support for the Indonesian decision to implement an effective economic stabilization plan. Kennedy observed that the United States sought to assist countries in the region to develop free from foreign domination and subversion, especially from China. He hoped that Indonesia would contribute to “the common task of making it possible for all the free nations in Asia to develop in peace and security.” The President concluded with a promise to “be in touch with you about my traveling plans when they become more definite.” (Ibid., National Security Files, Countries Series, Indonesia, Vol. III, 3/63–/63)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩