1. COMUSTDC has been studying for
several months the problem of what will be the effect on the GRC if it appears that acceptance of
two-China solution is imminent. He has not been able to coordinate his
studies with the Embassy but has discussed the essentials of his concern
with the Ambassador. The latter, emphasized the political nature of the
problem and indicated that COMUSTDC
was perhaps out of his field. In our opinions, it is the essence of
prudence for COMUSTDC to continue
to be concerned.
2. His study develops 3 possible GRC
courses of action:
A. Unilateral military action by the GRC,
B. GRC accommodation with Communist
C. Negotiation with the U.S. to salvage best possible concessions for
mainlander element resident on Taiwan.
3. Further study is required before a recommendation can be forwarded.
However, it is clear that the U.S. should anticipate GRC actions in case of a two-China decision
and should develop our own courses of action to meet future
4. Ref. A promulgates a statement of United States China policy which
presents U.S. policy intentions and lines of action with respect to
GRC and Red China. This paper is
reassuring. On the other hand, a rash of stories has appeared in U.S. newspapers reporting
that the U.S. is weighing an offer to admit Peiping to the UN Assembly. We note the difference between
policy statement suggested by Senator Goldwater and Mr. Nixon's advice
to shoot down unofficial reports that State is considering a change in
U.S. policy. Senator Scott44. Senator Hugh Scott
of Pennsylvania. has called attention to the fact that some
advisers are favoring admission of Red China to the UNGA and keeping Nationalist China on the
Security Council. These papers add to the Gimo's concern and
5. Ref. B reports kinds of unilateral military action which might be
taken by the GRC. We have been observing
for many months the GRC training
programs for dropping large groups of special forces. We are conversant
with the development of their plans for utilization of special forces.
Adm Smoot informs me that Mr.
Ray Cline is in Wash DC with
Amb Drumright. I recommend
strongly that you make arrangements through CIA to meet with Cline. He has been working with Chiang Ching-kuo for a long time.
6. Ref C is pertinent.
* Source: Department of State, Central Files,
793.00/7-1161. Top Secret. Also sent to JCA to pass for information
to JACE, AJCC, Fort Richie, Maryland. Repeated for information to
PACAF, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, and COMUSTDC.
1 The reference instruction, sent to
all U.S. diplomatic and consular missions, stated that its purpose
was to counteract the widespread expectation that the new U.S.
administration would make a rapid and substantial change of U.S.
policy toward China, and it set forth the basic U.S. position as
guidance for discussion with foreign officials and other interested
persons. (Ibid., 611.93/6-1661) See the Supplement.
2 It stated the view of Taiwan Defense Command
Commander Vice Admiral Roland N.
Smoot that Chiang
Kai-shek might undertake independent major action
against the mainland if his forces were in the highest possible
state of readiness, mainland conditions were at the worst possible
level, and he believed U.S. policy was changing so as to foreshadow
reduced U.S. support. (Department of State, Central Files,
611.93/7-1161) See the Supplement.
3 Not found. [text not
declassified] circulated as TDCSDB-3/647,621, July 19,
referred to [text not declassified]
(TDCSDB-3/647,522) as reporting the training of airdrop teams.
National Security Files, Countries Series, China)