Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

381. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State ⁰

Tokyo, November 1, 1963, 10 p.m.

1357. Ref: Deptel 1004 and Embtel 1356.¹ Joint Econ Com. Following is Japan political assessment as of November 1, 1963:

I. Summary

Japan continues on course as political, economic and defense partner of U.S., as increasingly important member free world, as contributor to UN objectives, and as active member Asian-African bloc where it plays ever more prominent role. Partly because of lingering, pacifistic yearning for neutralism growing out of Japan’s experience World War II, recent Limited Nuclear Test Ban Agreement and impression resulting improved east-west atmosphere have paved way for mood of detente in Japan. At same time USSR and CPR have in variety of ways redoubled blandishments to GOJ. Govt meeting situation with eyes open, well aware that eternal vigilance continues be price safety in Communist-threatened world. Fact is, however, detente mood militates against too abrupt assumption higher “posture” by Ikeda and GOJ and precludes, for example, any dramatic defense build-up early assumption full defense burden.

LDP will almost certainly be returned to power in general elections scheduled Nov 21 though probably with slightly diminished support as result of continuation of slow, long-term political trend. Moderately successful LDP record in election could consolidate Ikeda’s position in both Diet and own party and permit if not abandonment of “low posture” approach at least a degree of added initiative in moving Japan toward more responsible role on world scene.

Japan’s foreign policy reflects definite intention play greater role in field foreign economic assistance particularly Asian LDC’s. US-Japan security arrangements well established. Prevailing harmony affected to some extent dissonance over force readjustment and other relatively minor problems.

[Here follow sections on Japan’s domestic affairs and external relations.]

IV. Security Affairs

A. General

US-Japan relations under 1960 Security Treaty have steadily improved over past two years, characterized by increasingly closer coordination and consultation on security problems between Embassy and FonOff on other. [sic] On Japanese side strong pacifistic, anti-militarist feelings, which have been characteristic of the Japanese people since World War II and are somewhat less intense and over past year there has been distinct trend toward greater Japanese acceptance of realities of world strategic situation. PriMin and FonMin, both in public and private statements, have affirmed principle that Japan must greatly increase its own defense efforts if it is to assume its rightful role as a world power. While defense trend therefore favorable, should be borne in mind that neither Japanese Govt nor public is yet ready to undertake defense program of magnitude which US considers desirable. Present favorable trend in defense field has been accomplished with minimal pressures from US and adherence to our low pressure approach to Japanese continues offer by far safer and better course of action. Japanese will be more inclined accept unpalatable actions in defense area if GOJ takes these actions on own steam while we for our part keep them fully informed on our own defense thinking and planning and otherwise treat them as true and equal partners in defense problems of this area.

At present time there are four outstanding problems under active discussion and consideration by US and GOJ in defense field. These are: (1) US force readjustments; (2) military offset agreements; (3) cut-back and eventual elimination of US military assistance and (4) calls at Japanese ports by US atomic-powered submarines. These four questions are discussed in order below:

(1) Main thrust US force readjustment proposals currently being discussed with Japanese Govt is reduction in US Air Force presence in Japan, both aircraft and civilian personnel. Of paramount concern to Emb is proposal for complete withdrawal by July 1, 1965 of all US fighter interceptor aircraft presently stationed Japan (GOJ not informed this aspect readjustment). Withdrawal these aircraft (3 squadrons F-102s) will leave void in air defense of Japan which Japanese cannot fill from own defense resources by July 1, 1965. Of even greater concern to Emb is fear that withdrawal of all US defensive aircraft will leave US open to charge by opposition elements that US not fulfilling its commitments re defense of Japan under Security Treaty; and instead utilizing Japan only as base for US forward strategic air strike forces. This aspect of problem still under consideration in Washington.

(2) As result Deputy Secretary Defense Gilpatric’s February discussions defense problems with PriMin, in Tokyo, special US-Japan study group has discussed military offset purchase arrangements. Extensive lists of available US military equipment were submitted to GOJ for consideration in connection preparation JFY 64 defense budget. However, while GOJ increasing budget by estimated 40 billion yen ($112 million), no additional US equipment (beyond some items deleted from MAP) is to be included in JFY 64 program. Budget increase rather is being [utilized?] by GOJ to refurnish and improve existing badly dilapidated GOJ defense facilities, to accommodate rising defense costs, including pay increase for self defense forces, and cover cost certain US items originally scheduled be furnished by US under MAP. Hopefully, following elections, JFY 64 defense budget may be stretched to include purchase small amount additional US equipment. However, Japanese obviously not keen about entering into any large-scale military offset agreement with US. Primary GOJ interest lies in building up its own defense production base by producing its own military equipment in Japan. In this context, our best chance for achieving offset arrangement benefiting [garble] appears to lie in negotiating agreements permitting Japanese produce US equipment under licensing arrangements.

(3) Military assistance to Japan will apparently be drastically curtailed in US FY 64 and will be terminated in 1965 except for continuation certain small training programs. Since second Japanese defense buildup plan (now in its second year) was formulated by GOJ on basis approximate $50 million annual MAP contribution from US, curtailment of MAP poses serious problems for Japanese in carrying out second defense plan. This, in combination with proposed US force adjustments, will compel Japanese face up to realities own defense needs much sooner than they originally planned.

(4) Question port calls by US atomic-powered submarines has been under discussion with GOJ during most of year and has become class one political problem. While Ikeda govt accepts US might bring such submarines into Japan under security treaty and both Ikeda and FonMin have publicly affirmed intention allow entry these vessels at conclusion discussions with US regarding safety these ships and agreement on compensation arrangements in case of accident, opposition elements are continuing campaign arouse Japanese public to oppose entry SSNs on grounds ships constitute nuclear hazard to public and would involve Japan in US nuclear strategy. We expect soon finalize exchange official documents with GOJ and following GOJ approval eventual entry of first SSN.²

Reischauer

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, E 1 JAPAN-US. Secret. Repeated to Seoul, Taipei, Hong Kong, Manila, Saigon, Vientiane, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Kuala Lumpur, Djakarta, Canberra, Wellington, Rangoon, New Delhi, Karachi, Colombo, London, Paris, Moscow, Bonn, and Rome.
1. Document 380 and footnote 1 thereto.
2. See footnote 4, Document 378.