1934. Beam-Wang Talks. After regular 105th
37. Wang invited me to adjoining
apartment for a cup of coffee and conversation which lasted hour and
half with only interpreters each side present.
He began by saying move or gesture by US required for Laos solution. He
put particular stress on two points. First, if US withdrew forces and
advisers from Laos he was “certain Pathet Lao attacks would stop”.
Secondly, he said his side not satisfied with Souvanna Phouma original
idea to exclude Boun Oum and Nosavan from Cabinet. Intimated his side
willing to have latter two in Cabinet since representation three
factions necessary in new government in order “to accord with realities
Wang led up to above by long
expose Laos developments saying Souvanna Phouma “who belonged neither to
East nor West” only possible chief of government. Pathet Lao which had
started as very small force now a growing national movement which must
be given rightful role. ChiComs had 500 mile frontier with Laos and
would not tolerate hostile government. ChiComs had never intervened or
exerted pressure in Laotian affairs nor had they been accused of doing
so at present Geneva conference.
Wang then complained about
alleged remarks by Vice President Johnson in Taiwan that Marshal Chen Yi “insignificant figure who
spoke only from prepared texts.” Regretted this as personal attack
especially when US representative Geneva had complimented Chen Yi on elevated tone of debate.
Stressed continued presence Chen
Yi at Geneva sign of ChiCom patience and restraint.
Wang emphasized his personal
friendship with General Stilwell when latter military attache 1938 as
well as with other Americans. 600 million Chinese could not understand
US support Chiang Kai-shek as
Wang said had he had heard
Adlai Stevenson would
undertake mission shortly to convince Europeans on need “successor
state” solution for Chinese representation next UN whereby GRC and ChiComs
would become “successor states” to former China, GRC remaining on SC and ChiCom obtaining GA seat. He
scorned this as ridiculous. I replied not competent discuss Laos beyond
pointing out we required guarantees for neutral independent Laos through
ICC supervision effective cease-fire
and assurances country would be able remain independent and neutral.
Pathet was not to be regarded as neutral because of character outside
support. I said Chiang Kai-shek
one of oldest allies whom we would not abandon and whom we recognized as
head Government Republic of China. As to Taiwan area, pointed out US not
asking ChiComs abandon their case or even expecting them cease political
activities but were asking them join in renunciation of force in
interest removing risk of hostilities. Recalling Wang asked for US gesture said there
was one ChiComs could usefully make on grounds justice and advantage.
While US prisoners might seem small issue to Wang it was major question with US
public and their release would yield immediate and measurable benefits
in improving atmosphere. As to Stevenson, said not informed about such mission and knew
of no change in US position.
Comment: Wang's unusual
initiative in proposing informal tete-a-tete probably had its origin in
desire to exploit his presence on ChiCom delegation Geneva. It seems
likely he will follow it up with Steeves and perhaps seek opportunity for further
informal exchanges at Geneva. Wang probably expects me to respond with invitation to
similar informal get-together, as he referred to value of social
exchange between him and Johnson in 1955. This might be useful to us at some
appropriate future time, subject to Department's prior clearance.
On ChiRep matter, Wang appeared
wish spike any new move our part in UN
which would advocate less than SC membership for ChiComs. He did not,
however, specifically put his government on record as refusing sit with
GRC in UN under any conditions whatsoever.
Wang was at pains to adopt
friendly, persuasive, at times almost cajoling mood. He returned
constantly to theme that two governments should reconcile views and
could do so. He noted his government had often had many critical things
to say of US but that we should take this in good grace as it was for
our own benefit. He contrasted this with “flattery” of Syngman Rhee,5Former President of the Republic of Korea. Chiang Kai-shek and certain
Japanese toward US which, he asked, was of what real benefit. Throughout
conversation he was relaxed, attempted humorous sallies, and interjected
*Source: Department of State, Central Files,
611.93/6-3061. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to
Taipei and Geneva.