Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea ⁰

Washington, January 24, 1963, 6:10 p.m.

448. Your 521.¹

1. Congratulations on your success in moderating Pak’s plan for settling current crisis within ruling group. We agree optimism must be restrained until we see how events unfold in next few days. On basis your excellent reporting, however, it appears we may now pass through crisis and gain better relationship with Pak than previously existed.

2. At appropriate time assume you will wish to make use of improved rapport with Pak to advise him further on transition to civilian rule.

3. Line which you took with Pak in your talk January 16 (Embassy’s 503) is in general accord with our thinking.² We recognize that if Korean people believe transition to civilian rule has been rigged, chances of popularly supported and stable government may well be lost. Your advice to Pak on need for broader base for ruling group and for effective opposition therefore remains valid if it is not interpreted as effort to push Korea with unrealistic rapidity into American style representative government. In current Korean situation, political forms are probably less important than effective government with broad popular support. We therefore suggest that in future you place comments on need for broadening base of regime in context of overriding need to gain popular support. Regime must make more active effort to reach and influence important groups such as students, intellectuals, labor and farmers, and broaden popular support by promulgating and vigorously pursuing policies which accord with popular needs and aspirations.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/1-2463. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Yager, cleared in draft with Rice, and approved by Harriman.
1. In telegram 521 from Seoul, January 24, Berger reported that Chairman Pak had informed him through an emissary that he had taken the following positions to resolve the crisis of factionalism in the SCNR: Kim Chong-p’il would resign from the government’s political party and leave Korea for an extended trip; Pak had withdrawn his plan to relieve five anti-Kim officers from the SCNR; the SCNR and its political party would be separated; and Pak would run for President in the promised elections later in the year. (Ibid.)
2. In telegram 503, January 17, Berger reported the results of a 2-hour conversation on January 16 with Pak on the political situation. In telegram 504 from Seoul, January 18, Berger commented on this discussion. Telegram 504 was designated as “part two of two,” while telegram 503 was “part one of two.” (Ibid., 795B.00/1-1763 and 795B.00/1-1963)