280. Memorandum of Conversation Between the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) and the Korean Ambassador (Il Kwon Chung)0

The Ambassador and I talked for fifteen or twenty minutes while he was waiting to see the President. Mr. Norred, the Korean desk officer, was with us.

I raised the question of the possibility of reducing the size of the Korean army and transferring more resources to economic development. He agreed it would be desirable, if there was some way of doing it without increasing unemployment and if we in fact did sustain the total level of aid and transferred more for economic purposes. This much of the conversation took place in my office.

When Mr. Norred had left us and we were waiting in the Fish Room, the Ambassador said to me that he wanted to raise a question with me, speaking personally. He then spoke of the forthcoming visit of Colonel Kim, the head of the Korean CIA.1 He expressed great concern about whether Kim might interfere with the forthcoming elections. He thought it would be highly useful to have the Secretary of State or the Vice President talk briefly, informally, and directly with Kim to indicate the value we place on democratic processes and orderly government, and the dangers of covert interference with electoral processes.2

He repeated his fears of Kim, who he said was into many things that were none of his business. He also remarked on his earlier relations with Kim when the latter was a mere lieutenant, and stated that he himself would like to be a candidate for the Presidency of Korea.

CK
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95B/10-962. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Kaysen.
  2. Kaysen sent this memorandum and Document 281 under a covering memorandum to Harriman, October 9, noting that his conversation with Chung raised a “rather ticklish issue on Colonel Kim, the head of the Korean CIA. My own thought would be that it might indeed be very useful to have the Vice President talk with Kim when he is here, and if you like we can see what can be done about it.” A note on the bottom of the page signed H.S. [Harold Saunders of the NSC Staff?] reads as follows: “Mr. Rice, Mr. Yager: Harriman called Kaysen & told him Kim should not see the Vice President (but OK to see Atty Genl) that it was wrong to grade him up to the V.P. level, etc. Kaysen agreed.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.95B/10-962)
  3. Ambassador Chung made a similar suggestion “as a private citizen” to Rice on September 28. (Memorandum of conversation, September 28; ibid., 033.95B11/9-2862) On October 15, Chung met with William Bundy and made similar points. (Ibid., 033.95B11/10-1562) On October 20, Chung met with Maxwell Taylor and asked him to see Kim, suggesting that Taylor encourage him to be flexible in negotiations for settlement of differences with Japan and to reiterate the need to allow the 1963 elections to be conducted in a democratic manner. (Memorandum for the record, October 23; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, 333 Korea)