278. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 0
REPORT FROM GENERAL TAYLOR
You are meeting with General Taylor at 5:00 p.m. on Tuesday, September 25th in the Cabinet Room. Others who have been asked are: Secretary Rusk (or Ball), Secretary McNamara (or Gilpatric), Governor Harriman, Messrs. Nitze, Sullivan, Forrestal and Komer.1
General Taylor will report on his trip to the Far East and will amplify the points made in his recent cable (CINCPAC 200410Z to Department), a copy of which was sent to you.2
You may wish to take advantage of the opportunity raised by General Taylor’s concise statement of the issue of ROK force cuts in paragraph B of his cable. The JCS has been, as you know, strongly opposed to any consideration of such cuts on the grounds that the joint U.S.-ROK mission in Korea is to defend against a combined North Korean-ChiCom assault against the ROK.
It seems to me that such a contingency, if it occurred would raise a question which would go far beyond what we faced in Korea in 1950. If this is true, should we not re-examine our very expensive commitments in Korea to see if they still are based on realistic contingencies.
You might wish, for example, to ask the Joint Chiefs to examine what size ROK force would be necessary to hold South Korea against a non-nuclear [Page 606] attack by North Korean forces alone. Then they might consider what other military dispositions we might make both in Korea and outside it to deter the ChiComs from assisting the Koreans in such an attack.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Korea, General, 8/62-3/63. Top Secret.↩
- Forrestal drafted a memorandum for the record, September, 26, outlining the action requested by the President in light of his meeting with Taylor and others at 5 p.m. on September 25. According to Forrestal’s memorandum: “The President authorized a re-study of force requirements in South Korea in light of a concurrent study on the advisability of using [text not declassified] in the event of a massive assault against South Korea by combined ChiCom and North Korean Forces.” (Ibid., Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memos, Forrestal)↩
- See footnote 1, Document 277. Part B of the telegram is similar to Document 277, but does not provide as much supporting analysis and detail.↩