271. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State 0
85. 1. We have been having rocky time here during past couple months, and while situation is better in sense that new PriMin and Economic Ministers are working with us in fairly cooperative fashion, I am still not happy about certain aspects of situation.
2. Basic problem is power of Kim Chong Pil and ROK CIA. Kim was given severe shaking and for few days in June and again in July it looked as if his organization was going to be cut back to its basic intelligence mission. Pak gave me assurances of this on two occasions, but there is no sign this has been done.
[Page 590]3. ROK CIA has curious set-up. One part devoted to usual activities. Second part consists of political, economic, legislative and public information divisions: which occupy themselves with major policy matters. Numbers employed in latter are large; we have no access to them; and some of their key people have record of past Communist or leftist associations or hold extreme anti-American views. Moreover ROK CIA is in “everything”—appointments, lodging their people in newspapers and business, deriving income from variety of sources from stock market to business deals, etc.
4. If Pak carries out his assurance to return ROK CIA to its proper function, or if its extra-curricular activities are separated from ROK CIA, we can then deal with Kim Chong Pil on a tidy basis. But there is a real possibility that Kim Chong Pil may continue in the same capacity with the same all-embracing functions, in which case we will have serious problem of whether and how to deal with him.
5. In a recent conversation with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Political Counselor, Kim Chong Pil expressed his resentment, frustration, and some bitterness [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] at our refusal to accept him as a major direct channel for communication with ROKG on other matters. He said he wears two hats which are completely separate, and we were to recognize this and deal with him on all matters, for he is the real power and policy maker in the government, and he is going to continue in that capacity. He asked them to convey his desire for direct and regular contact with me. He made it clear that anyone in or out of the mil govt who tries to take his power away had better watch out, and that he is going to “get” those on the Supreme Council who are trying to reduce his power. At same time he went to some length to try to assure us that stability had been reestablished at top leadership and contending factors had agreed work together in furtherance revolutionary goals.
6. In two conversations with him, once with me in March and once with one of our [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] officers in July, he said that if it ever becomes necessary to preserve the “revolution,” (i.e. preserve his power, which he identifies with the revolution), he will do whatever is necessary, including even “toppling” Pak Chong-hui.
7. We will be analyzing the implications of foregoing in separate message.1
8. Meantime we are picking up rumors that there is resentment in some ROK Govt circles over my actions during past couple months. One such rumor has it that Kim Chong Pil is out to get “certain Americans.” Another, that some weeks ago Pak wrote Amb Chong Il-kwon to arrange [Page 591] for my recall. According this rumor, Chong replied this was impossible and he would resign if ordered to do so, after which Pak wrote back “to forget it.” I cannot vouch for reliability latter rumor, but I believe that idea of declaring me PNG has been considered. [3 lines of source text not declassified] However, a recent report has it that some around Pak are anxious that close contact and good relations be reestablished between him and me.
9. I should add that according reliable Korean source, Van Fleet made deprecating remarks about me to Pak and Kim Chong Pil, which has not helped matters, and I am thinking of discussing this with him when he returns in a few days.