269. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- The Korean Military Government
PARTICIPANTS
- General James A. Van Fleet
- Edward E. Rice, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
- Donald S. Macdonald, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, Office of East Asian Affairs
General Van Fleet called by appointment at 10:00 a.m. With very few preliminaries he turned immediately to the subject of the Korean military government, of whom he said that “these are good boys”. He stated that “everything is going fine” in Korea; and that the United States should give these leaders our support. He referred to the new Korean Cabinet appointments approvingly as bringing civilian bankers into key posts. He urged that now was the time for the State Department to make a suitable statement of United States support, to give encouragement to the Korean Government. He complained of the effect of Washington statements indicating lack of confidence in the military government, and cited a statement attributed to Secretary Dillon that if Korea were to become a state-run economy, it should not receive another dollar of aid. Mr. Rice commented that he had never heard or read of such a statement, and inquired what its source was. General Van Fleet stated that it came from “American sources.”
[Page 586]Turning to the subject of Colonel Kim Chong-p’il, Director of the Korean CIA, General Van Fleet said that he was indispensable to the Korean Government at the present time. He and Chairman Pak continued to be very close, and were working together; there was no real trouble within the regime. General Van Fleet had talked to “Tiger” Song (General Song Yo-ch’an, ex-Prime Minister), to Kim Chong-p’il and to Chairman Pak, and had heard the views of each. Mr. Rice inquired whether the Chairman’s and Kim’s reports had agreed. The General said they had. He continued that he had told both the Chairman and Colonel Kim that Kim should stay within his field, and not get beyond it, as he had with the Walker Hill project (a foreign tourist center) and the taxi import and assembly project. In the Walker Hill case, however, Colonel Kim had been asked to undertake it because he was the only man who could accomplish the job.
Mr. Rice asked about Kim’s involvement in the stock market deal. The General answered, first, that Colonel Kim’s involvement in it had never been proved; then, that opposition forces had endeavored to use the stock market for political fund-raising, against which countermeasures were necessary; finally, that business optimism, coupled with the scarcity of opportunities for investment, had forced the market up. Mr. Macdonald commented that the power available to the Korean Government should have enabled it to control the market and avoid a speculative spiral, if it had wished.
General Van Fleet commented [2 lines of source text not declassified] that the U.S. military intelligence sources were the best, and that we should look to them for information. Mr. Macdonald stated that both the Department and the Embassy in Seoul were receiving intelligence reports from the Eighth Army; that these reports were very helpful; but that they did not conflict in their general import with information from other sources.
Mr. Rice asked whether General Van Fleet had given the Ambassador his views and observations on Korea, and the General affirmed that he had done so.
General Van Fleet recalled his wartime experiences in Korea, when the Korean military were very eager to have American guidance and American approval. They would respond even to his unspoken thoughts—he would think, for example, that a hill should be taken, and before he knew it, it would be in ROK hands. Since then the Koreans had matured; they wanted to do things for themselves, in their own way; but they still wanted and needed American approval and commendation when they did well. Of course, they sometimes acted rashly, and made mistakes. The currency reform had been such a mistake. Nevertheless, the Koreans had been quick to acknowledge their error, and to correct it. Having done so, they expected our approval. We must understand the [Page 587] Koreans’ nature in our dealings with them. In this connection, it would be very desirable for the United States to make an appropriate public statement of our support. The Secretary, for example, might make a prepared statement.
Mr. Rice said that the United States had already made clear its support. Mr. Macdonald cited Ambassador Berger’s May 16 statement for the Educational Radio Network,1 and promised, at General Van Fleet’s request, to send him a copy. Mr. Rice continued that he welcomed the General’s strong partisan support of the military government, commenting that it was a needed source of help for the Koreans.
Mr. Rice continued that he had known Ambassador Berger and his work for some years, and had every confidence in him. He hoped that General Van Fleet, also, would cooperate with the Ambassador, give him his confidence and keep him informed. General Van Fleet agreed, and continued that while in Korea he had done his best to avoid creating difficulties for the Ambassador. He himself, although by nature a modest person, was willy-nilly a hero in Korea, and always received and treated as one, though he never wanted it. He had sometimes felt that this must make it difficult for the Ambassador.
The General wondered why Korea should have such a generally bad press in the United States. He had commented on this point to some of his friends, who agreed. Mr. Macdonald stated that the many achievements of Korea were unfortunately overshadowed by Korean crises, which appeared to be more newsworthy. General Van Fleet mentioned that he had heard of an American newspaper story that the level of U.S. economic aid to Korea was to be reduced. Mr. Macdonald said there had been some speculative stories, but he had seen no such report.
Turning to the question of military procurement in Korea, General Van Fleet urged that U.S. purchases be increased, and that Secretary McNamara’s recent order not be allowed to affect procurement in Korea. He suggested that some procurement now being made in Japan might be made in Korea, referring as example to a suggestion by a U.S. military officer that trucks now being bought in Japan ready to run could be purchased in stripped form and assembled in Korea with Korean tires and batteries, which now are just as good as American makes. The Japanese had already benefited enormously by U.S. purchases there—for example, he himself had spent over $100 million in Japan for rehabilitating the Korean transportation system (while he was in command in Korea). Korean suppliers to U.S. procurement agencies were private firms, and loss of this business would be a terrible blow to them.
[Page 588]Mr. Rice assured General Van Fleet that he sympathized with this position and understood the prospective adverse effects of the directive on Korea, but pointed out that the directive had been issued in response to the need to redress the U.S. balance of payments.
In concluding pleasantries, General Van Fleet said he would go to New York to attend two directors’ meetings—Twentieth Century Fox, in connection with the possible ouster of Mr. Skouros, and Webb-Knapp, in connection with a similar situation involving Mr. Zeckendorf. He had come back from Korea for these meetings, and would return to Korea after they were over.