267. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan 0

90. 1. This message for your comment constitutes policy directive being considered to govern US actions for promoting normalization of relations between Republic of Korea and Japan.

2. US objective is to bring about a settlement of outstanding differences and establishment normal diplomatic and economic relations between ROK and Japan, in order reduce tensions and promote security in Western Pacific and increase rate of Korean economic development.

3. General US course of action should be: (a) to stress to both sides the advantages of a settlement in their own respective national interests; (b) to use US influence and good offices with both sides to bring about settlement through realistic, forthcoming, and reasonable negotiation; (c) to suggest to both sides the use of well established Japanese-Korean practice of go-between for prior confidential exchange of information concerning range of settlement figures that will be acceptable at formal negotiations, and to act as go-between if requested; (d) if necessary to encourage both sides to look to US for confidential transmission of messages; (e) to seek discreetly to serve during course of negotiations as confidential informants to Chairman Pak and (if necessary) to Japanese Prime Minister on course of negotiations and conduct of negotiators; (f) to avoid rupture of negotiations or talks; (g) to maintain disinterested posture toward special interests of parties, playing role of catalyst but not acting as a party to negotiations. Specific actions are set forth in following paragraphs.

4. As soon as practicable following Ikeda’s reappointment as Prime Min and formation new Japanese Cabinet, and subject to conditions reasonable political stability Korea, US Ambassador Tokyo will approach Prime Min and prevail upon him to set early date for resuming negotiations with Korea at political level, preferably in Seoul.

5. Subject to consultation between US Ambassadors Seoul and Tokyo, Seoul will approach ROKG at highest level, prevailing upon Koreans (a) to think in terms of claims settlement package of reasonable proportions including claims payments, grants, and long-term soft loans which can be accepted as package without emphasis on claims; (b) to name as their chief negotiator an individual who will deal effectively, reasonably and authoritatively with the Japanese.

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6. In this connection, Embassies Tokyo and Seoul will immediately undertake review all outstanding issues between ROK and Japan, ascertaining positions of two sides and differences between them, with view to determining whether differences on fisheries or other issues aside from claims will impede overall settlement if claims issue resolved. Embassies should recommend possible US contribution toward settlement these issues, such as provision technical consultants from US or other countries.

7. As basis for influencing Japanese, Embassy Tokyo will stress in representations to GOJ officials the European and US business interest in Korean development.

8. Japanese officials should also be discreetly reminded of recent US cooperation in encouraging Korean-Japanese trade despite our own balance-of-payments problems—e.g., our facilitation of Korean nitrogenous fertilizer purchases; our provision of barley to Korea under PL 480 so that Korea could barter rice for additional fertilizer.

9. As basis for influencing Koreans, Embassy Seoul will stress in representations to ROKG officials that in joint consultation re Five Year Economic Development Plan, ROK and US must consider all potential capital resources additional to those of US, including Europe and particularly Japan, as well as export market opportunities in Japan. If additional pressure on the ROK Government is required to produce a bargain in the face of reasonable Japanese offer, US Development Lending may be related to this settlement.

10. Embassy Seoul will also point out to Koreans the desirability of publicity on fisheries issue designed to show (a) importance this issue to both countries, (b) Korean willingness to negotiate reasonable settlement. Such approach would give GOJ useful domestic argument for settlement with ROK, and would remind Japanese of Korean bargaining lever.

11. US Embassies Bonn, Paris, London, Rome and USRO will discreetly promote European government and business interests in investment Korea and offer US assistance in selecting suitable projects and examining possibilities for US public or private participation.

12. Department will approach suitable individual to travel to Korea as special representative to attend August 15 ceremonies Seoul and talk with ROKG leaders about development problems (contingent upon favorable political situation Korea). Assuming favorable reception by Koreans, same individual would visit Japan for talks with GOJ leaders and would thereafter be available on standby basis to be called in as consultant to both sides as appropriate. Representative could fulfill much of purpose envisaged in Embassy Seoul’s proposal for high-level envoy (Seoul’s telegram 1126)1 thus cloaking his connection with ROK-Japan [Page 581] negotiations but providing preliminary contacts as a basis for future good offices. He might carry Presidential letters to Ikeda and Pak, encouraging free and frank discussion with him on current issues and referring in passing to question ROK-Japan relations.2

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 694.95B/7-1362. Secret. Drafted by Macdonald; cleared by Yager, Peterson, Rice, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs Philip H. Trezise, and in draft by Janow; and approved by McGhee. Also sent to Seoul as telegram 40 and repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD and Paris for USRO.
  2. Dated April 26. (Ibid., 694.95B/4-2662)
  3. In telegram 224 from Tokyo, July 24, the Embassy stated that while it endorsed the objectives of this telegram, its reaction was that the proposed policy “oversteps influence which we can exert on Japan in bringing about ROK-Japan settlement, and underestimates dangers, at least in Japan, if we were to press forward with expanded U.S. role.” The Embassy recommended against any dramatic U.S. steps. (Ibid., 694.95B/7-2462)