Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

262. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, June 11, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Reopening of Status of Forces Negotiations with Korea

Ever since the United States Government promised to negotiate “promptly” a status of forces agreement with the Republic of Korea in the Dulles-Rhee joint statement of August 1953,¹ every Korean Government has pressed for such negotiations. Meanwhile, the Commander of the U.S. forces in Korea has continued to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel under the “Taejon Agreement” of 1950² and the Economic Coordination Agreement of 1952.³

The Defense Department long opposed a status of forces agreement because of the unique state of suspended hostilities in Korea and the presumably unsatisfactory Korean legal system. In April 1961, however, with Defense Department agreement, negotiations for a full status of forces agreement were begun.⁴ When the civil government was overthrown one month later, the talks were suspended.

In June 1961, the new military government requested that the United States reopen negotiations, but in view of the unstable situation and uncertainty at that time as to the intentions of the regime, this request was refused.

In March of this year, the ROK Government again requested the resumption of negotiations. On May 14, the ROK Government was informed that the United States Government would be willing to reopen negotiations provided it could obtain a written commitment in advance that the question of criminal jurisdiction would not be raised for discussion until a new constitutional government had been formed (scheduled for next year) and normal legal processes had been fully restored.⁵ About two weeks later, the ROK Government rejected this proposal, contrary to earlier private assurances by the Foreign Minister that it would be accepted, offering instead to postpone the signing and putting into effect of any agreement reached until the above conditions had been met.

On June 9 the United States reiterated this basic proposal, but dropped the request for an advance written commitment.⁶ This, too, was rejected by Chairman Pak, who speculated that the problem might be handled by placing the subject of criminal jurisdiction on the status of forces agenda but postponing discussion from time to time. The Foreign Minister later said that the government was prepared to pass a “special law” regarding the U.S. and UN forces in Korea which would meet U.S. standards. He indicated that this could be done during the coming year, apparently concurrently with status of forces negotiations.

In the last week, a number of Korean student demonstrations have occurred in Seoul and elsewhere, protesting recent unfortunate incidents involving U.S. military personnel, and demanding a status of forces agreement. These demonstrations apparently were not inspired by the government, and they reflect a genuine nationalistic feeling which regards a status of forces agreement as an essential symbol of sovereignty. The Koreans are well aware of the fact that the United States has, or is negotiating, status of forces agreements with other countries in which large U.S. forces are maintained.

In this connection, Koreans can point out that the United States has an agreement covering all its NATO allies, an agreement with Japan, and a base agreement with the Philippines. They know that the United States is negotiating an agreement with the Republic of China. Not unnaturally, they feel that the United States discriminates against the ROK.

We have requested Ambassador Berger’s views on the current impasse with the ROK Government over the reopening of SOFA negotiations.⁷ When we have received the Ambassador’s views, we will consult with the Defense Department on further steps that may be required in the present situation.

E.S. Little⁸

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Korea, General, 6/62. Confidential. The Department of State copy of this memorandum indicates Elmer Hulen of FE/EA is the drafter; Yager, Rice, and Harriman cleared in draft; and Robert M. Winfree of G/PM cleared in final. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/6-1162)
1. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950-1955, pp. 2674-2676.
2. Entered into force on July 28, 1950. (1 UST 705)
3. Entered into force on May 24, 1953. (3 UST 4430)
4. See footnote 3, Document 209.
5. The Embassy was instructed in telegram 1041 to Seoul, May 11, to so inform the ROK Government. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.95B7/4-2761)
6. This information was transmitted in telegram 1104 to Seoul, June 8. (Ibid., 611.95B7/5-2962)
7. In telegram 1277 from Seoul, June 12, the Embassy reported that the ROK Government “appears to have taken steps to calm press and public on SOFA issue, recognizing inherent danger to government stability as emotionalism generated got out of hand.” Berger stated that the Department could “rely on ROKG assurances postpone discussions jurisdiction for some time and then discuss at leisurely pace.” He proposed that the negotiations be resumed in July on this basis and with the understanding that an agreement could not be signed until normal constitutional and legal procedures were restored in South Korea. (Ibid., 611.95B7/6-1262)
8. Little signed for Brubeck above Brubeck’s typed signature.