The USG position must be that it stands
on what is outlined in the President's seven-point statement. We cannot
safely get ourselves in the position of negotiating on this.
In the light of the above our comments on the GRC ABC formulation are as follows:
Point A goes further than the seven-point statement in that it commits
the United States to a drop of a 200 man unit with only the date subject
to discussion and joint agreement. The statement only contemplated
studying the feasibility of such a drop, preparing two aircraft for
possible GRC use and making them
available only if hard evidence is obtained to support the conclusion
that such an operation would succeed.
In connection with the lack of hard evidence no mention is made of point
four of the seven-point statement.
The statements in Points B and C that the United States Government and
the GRC will “study” subsequent
clandestine and open military actions and “jointly decide” their
“execution and timing” could be interpreted to commit the United States
to approve such actions in advance and by implication to support them.
The seven-point statement made no mention of subsequent actions.
* Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries
Series, China, CIA Cables,
3/62-4/62. Top Secret. No time of transmission is indicated on the
1 An April 14 message from
Bundy reported that Chiang Kai-shek had agreed to
postpone the target date for possible action against the mainland
from June until October and to work with U.S. officials to achieve a
common understanding of the requirements of the mainland situation
but that he wanted reassurance of the following: agreement on
October 1 as the beginning date of the initial airdrop, agreement to
begin joint study of plans for secret or open military operations to
follow up a successful airdrop, and agreement that the execution and
timing of an initial airdrop and subsequent action would be decided
jointly by the two governments in the light of circumstances at that
time. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.
2 An April 19 message
from Cline to
Bundy stated that although
Bundy's message had “plunged Chiang Ching-kuo and Gimo into
another trough of despair and made me sweat blood trying to resell
seven points,” Chiang
Ching-kuo had told him that day that “Gimo willing
accept seven points as basis close study and cooperation during next
few months” and had authorized senior staff discussions of GRC clandestine and military plans. He
added, “For moment situation under control but believe me it was
close thing. Cooperative relationship liable come unstuck if not
given sympathetic attention this end and tangible signs of active
interest from Washington.” (Filed with an April 23 memorandum from
Forrestal to Harriman; Library of Congress
Manuscript Division, Harriman
Administrations, Subject Files, China) See the Supplement.