106. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
Monday morning session with new Libyan PM Fekini is so you can gently talk him out of asking for a whole new aid program.
[Page 158]This country of only 1,250,000 has lived on US largesse for years ($206 million through FY 1963). Now it’s swimming in oil—$64 million royalties this year, over $100 million next year, and up to $300 million annually later. So it is another Kuwait, which doesn’t need any more US aid.
But Fekini is using Wheelus base as a lever to pry more aid out of us. Under our 1960 agreement the “rent” for Wheelus will drop from $10 million annually 1960-64 to $1 million per annum 1965-71. He alleges growing local anti-base pressures, and says the best way to offset this is a big contribution to Libyan development.
Our best counter is to tell him frankly that Wheelus (and the UK bases in Cyrenaica) are oil-rich Libya’s best guarantee against takeover by Nasser next door. Our presence is Libya’s real security. We don’t see why we should have to pay for the privilege of giving protection (and he should get this across to his critics). Besides, it is mostly US investment which provides Libya’s oil wealth. So you could explain why Congress won’t favor yet more aid to a country which is doing so well (we don’t give aid to Saudi Arabia or Kuwait either—yet protect both).
We want to make clear that what Libya needs is not money but technical help in learning to use wisely all the money it’s already getting (and squandering). We’re prepared to continue providing such help, and also some more MAP.
Fekini may also make some anti-Israeli noises; if so, you might set him straight that we don’t intend to let Arabs attack Israel or vice versa.
You impressed Fekini greatly last time he saw you (he was ambassador here) by airing some general policy views. He’ll be quite responsive if you do so again.2
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Libya 1963. Secret.↩
- On September 30, Komer sent a follow-up memorandum to the President, explaining that in 1960 the United States had “upped the ante (1) to keep Wheelus, (2) to take credit for help we were giving anyway to ease the Libyan government over the hump until oil revenues put it on its feet, but (3) to leave the door open to stop grant aid when oil revenues began pouring in.” He noted that those revenues had mounted faster than anyone expected “so while we have to come through with the promised $10 million next year, we want to hold the line after that.” (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩