Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa

100. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

JCSM-857-62

Washington, October 31, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Army and Air Force Survey Team Reports, Libya

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 6 October 1962, subject as above.

2. The US military interest in Libya centers primarily on the continued use of Wheelus Air Base. From a military point of view there is no requirement for assistance to Libya beyond that necessary to assure the unrestricted use of this air base by the United States and to preclude increased Communist influence in Libya. Conditions necessary for such assurance include a friendly Libyan Government, internal stability, and internal security. There is a need to establish conditions in Libya which will favor an orderly transfer of power to a Western-oriented group upon the death of King Idris. However, there is no present external threat to Libya. Further, Libya’s treaty with the United Kingdom guarantees that the UK will come to the assistance of Libya in the event of an attack. For these reasons, and especially in view of the prospects of continually decreasing military assistance funds, the United States should carefully scrutinize any proposal for assistance to Libya with a view toward providing the very minimum necessary to realize the US objectives. The Survey Team Reports have been examined with this principle in mind.

3. The Report on the Development of Libyan Air Force, dated 12 September 1962, provides for establishment of a Libyan Air Force of four T-33 jet trainer aircraft, six C-47 transport aircraft, two E-4 helicopters, and ancillary equipment at a cost of approximately $3 million over a six-year period. It is understood that the program outlined in this Report has been approved by you, except for the light helicopters, and that the President has informed the Libyan Crown Prince of the intention to provide this assistance. In order that the Government of Libya may have access to remote areas, conduct border surveillance, and perform rescue operations and civic actions, it is believed the two light helicopters should be retained in the plan as recommended by the USAF Survey Team. Maintenance capability will be available at Wheelus Air Base.

4. The US Army Survey Team Report, dated 24 September 1962,¹ provides for forces necessitating a Military Assistance Program (MAP) of $9.8 million over the period CY 1962-66. In light of the fact that the Libyan Army need not be manned and equipped for countering an external threat, the program recommended in the Report appears excessive. Also, it is believed that such a program is larger than can be afforded under present and anticipated availability of funds. Accordingly, certain reductions should be made in the proposed Army Program. Since USCINCEUR must incorporate Libyan MAPs within his over-all MAP dollar ceiling, he should be given an opportunity to recommend revisions to the US Army Survey Team Report toward the objective of reducing the cost of the program set forth in the Report. In revising the Report, two primary objectives should be kept in mind:

a. The over-all cost of the program must be reduced. In revising the program downward, USCINCEUR will need some target as a guide. To this end, $6 million is believed reasonable, taking into consideration the size of the army, the type of equipment needed for the internal security mission, and the possibility of negotiating a cost-sharing formula.

b. In establishing the size and organization of the proposed Libyan Army, primary emphasis should be placed on the mission of internal security. In this regard, cognizance must be taken of the 5,000 man army ceiling previously agreed upon between you and the Libyan Minister of Defense in the context of developing Libyan materiel requirements.

5. Consideration should also be given to a cost-sharing formula with Libya. It is noted that the FY 64-68 Military Assistance Plan for support of the Libyan Air Force has been prepared on a 50-50 cost-sharing basis. However, two factors are of especial importance with regard to Libya. First, assistance to Libya is actually payment for the use of facilities in Libya and a cost-shared program has far less bargaining power than an outright grant program, especially to a poor country. Second, increasing oil revenues are expected to materially improve Libya’s economic position over the next several years. These two factors might be satisfied through negotiations with Libya toward a cost-sharing formula whereby the United States would pay the entire cost of military assistance furnished Libya for the first two years with the US proportion of costs thereafter being reduced each year. Perhaps a US ratio of 75% the third year, 50% the fourth year, and 25% the fifth year would be acceptable to both countries.

6. Finally, the Army Report recommends that materiel valued at nearly $1 million be delivered in Libya prior to 24 December 1962, Libya’s National Independence Day. Shipment of such a large quantity of materiel in the short time remaining before 24 December is impractical and could be accomplished only by establishing an overriding priority for Libyan requirements. However, it is considered desirable that a token shipment be made prior to that date. Ten M-113 armored personnel carriers could be diverted from other claimants, if such action was directed, and would give visible evidence of US intentions to further assist Libya in establishing an effective army.

7. Implementation of the Air Force Program will necessitate a manpower increase for the Air Force Section of the MAAG from one officer and two enlisted to two officers and three enlisted. Additionally, it is contemplated that a MAP training mission consisting of four officers and 13 enlisted will be activated as part of the 7272d Air Base Wing. Approval of the Army Program will necessitate a small increase in the manpower authorization for the Army Section of the MAAG.

8. It is recommended that:

a. The two helicopters be approved for inclusion in the Air Force Program for Libya.

b. The US Army Survey Team Report be returned to USCINCEUR for downward revision. A proposed message for this purpose is attached as the Appendix hereto.

c. A cost-sharing formula be negotiated with Libyan authorities toward gradual assumption of all costs of the Libyan Air Force and Army by Libya.

d. Ten M-113 armored personnel carriers be diverted from other claimants and delivered in Libya prior to 24 December 1962.³

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

John A. Heintges⁴
Major General, USADeputy Director, Joint Staff

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Libya 123.7-686, 1962. Secret. An appendix containing specific JCS and OSD comments on a July 1962 draft of the U.S. Army Survey Team Report on Libya is attached but not printed.
1. Not printed. (Ibid., Libya 091.3-1-20233162, 1962)
3. On November 7, Deputy Assistant Secretary Bundy sent a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitting the Department of Defense’s approval of their October 31 recommendations, except for the proposed cost-sharing arrangement. (Ibid.)
4. Printed from a copy that indicates Heintges signed the original.