Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

134. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State¹

Brussels, October 31, 1961, 4 p.m.

790. Congo: Re: Department telegrams 954²and 1020³ and Embassy telegram 748.⁴

Although I received Department telegram 1020 shortly before I saw Spaak last evening, there was insufficient time for me to prepare text to hand him. Accordingly I spoke to him about message from Secretary and promised to send him text (which I delivered to Rothschild this morning).

Spaak said that following our meeting October 23 he had requested Foreign Office as matter of urgency to make thorough study as to financial, economic, or other measures that might be taken to bring greater pressure on Tshombe. While this study not complete, it already clear that there are serious legal as well as political difficulties involved. However, he fully agrees that maximum pressure must be exerted on Tshombe and assured me that he wishes to take all feasible steps. In addition to possible financial and economic steps Spaak has already decided to proceed with following three measures:

1. He will deny or withdraw (if physically possible) passports of all Belgian mercenaries and make public announcement of this today or tomorrow.

2. He is replacing Belgian military in Belgian Consul General in Elisabethville with civilian functionaries (Department telegram 1008 and Embassy telegram 786).⁵

3. He has ordered Longerstaey (Belgian representative Léopoldville) and Colonel Vandewalle (in charge Belgian Consul General Elisabethville) to return to Brussels to discuss possible measures which may be taken to bring Tshombe and Adoula together.

Spaak warned however that his relations with Tshombe were very close to breaking point and that Tshombe had recently threatened to nationalize certain Belgian industrial interests in Katanga “if hostile attitude of Spaak and GOB continues”. Despite risks involved in GOB relations with Tshombe, Spaak felt above three steps would be helpful and therefore he is taking them. However, tenseness of relations with Tshombe and latter’s ability to do lasting damage to legitimate Belgian interests in Katanga emphasizes difficulties and risks involving precipitous financial and economic sanctions against Tshombe.

MacArthur

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–161. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Léopoldville, London, Paris, and USUN.
2. Document 132.
3. Telegram 1020 to Brussels, October 29, transmitted the text of a letter from Rusk to Spaak emphasizing the importance the United States attached to the need to bring about the peaceful integration of Katanga with the rest of the Congo as soon as possible, and reiterating the U.S. request for Spaak’s assistance in bringing political and economic pressures to bear on Tshombe, including convincing Belgian business interests in Katanga to cooperate in this. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–2961)
4. Telegram 748 from Brussels, October 23, reported that MacArthur had discussed telegram 954 (Document 132) with Spaak, who replied that he would give the U.S. suggestion close study but it raised serious political, legal, and practical problems. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–2361)
5. Dated October 27 and 30. (Ibid., 325.70G/10–2761 and 770G.5455/10–3061)