384. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
SUBJECT
- Bill Attwood’s Activities
I refer to our conversation this morning about the next step in the Bill Attwood story. In the event we are going to move soon on this one (after [Page 899] your assurances re Oswald, I, for one, am in favor), for a starter, here are some rough guidelines which you may want to consider.
- 1.
- Bill Attwood should call Lechuga and make an appointment to see him.
At the meeting he should say the following:
- (a)
- The new Administration has not yet had an opportunity to examine the Cuban question in detail.
- (b)
- However, in deference to the late President’s judgment that it is worthwhile to hear what is on Castro’s mind, and in view of the fact that what Castro says may have a bearing on the new Administration’s eventual assessment of the Cuban situation, I am authorized to hear you out.
- (c)
- (After hearing Lechuga’s story.) You can rest assured that the information will be passed on to the proper people. If we are interested in further talks, I will let you know.
- 2.
- We should emphasize to Bill that the meeting must be held with complete discretion; should news of the meeting leak out, Bill should be in a position to issue a foolproof denial. In this regard, we are glad that Lisa Howard is now out of the picture. She should be given no intimation that further U.S./Cuban contact is taking place.
- 3.
-
One main problem is that, in his meeting with Lechuga, Bill may tend to convey a spirit of accommodation, which, when reported, could relieve Castro of an increased anxiety which the assassination of President Kennedy seems to have produced and which is in our interest to maintain. Therefore, we should stress to Bill that he must convey the sense of an interested but non-committal listener, completely confident of his position. Expressed in words, the mood should be roughly as follows:
“Fidel, we are content to let events continue on their present course. We intend to maintain, and whenever possible, to increase our pressure against you until you fall; we are pretty certain that we will be successful. Moreover, you can forget about getting ‘another Cuba’ in the Hemisphere. We have learned our lesson and ‘another Cuba’ is simply not going to happen. However, we are reasonable men. We are not intent on having your head per se; neither do we relish the suffering of the Cuban people. You know our central concerns—the Soviet connection and the subversion. If you feel you are in a position to allay these concerns, we can probably work out a way to live amicably together and to build a prosperous Cuba. If you don’t feel you can meet our concerns, then just forget the whole thing; we are quite content to continue on our present basis.”
- 4.
- I agree that it is questionable whether Bill Attwood is the man to convey the message. On the other hand, an Ed Martin type who, in his bones, probably does not believe in the possibility of accommodation would not lend the right flavor to the meeting either. There must be a delicate balance. Given the choice between the two types, I would pick the [Page 900] believer, Bill, and arm him with a good, stiff brainwashing and education in Cuban affairs before he meets with Lechuga. Frankly, if really given my choice, I would pick you for the job. Is there any way you could do it and not be conspicuous (e.g. outside New York or Washington)?
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Sensitive.↩