Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

358. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Action in the Event of Cuban Attack on U.S. Aircraft/Ships (U)

At your direction on 28 February 1963, Rules of Engagement were promulgated with respect to action by U.S. forces in event of a Cuban attack on U.S. aircraft or ships operating outside Cuban territory.¹ These rules prohibit U.S. forces from penetrating Cuban territory in pursuit of Cuban forces involved.

Under these rules, overflight of Cuban territory while en route to the scene of attack is not included in the authorized military options for responses to an attack by Cuba on U.S. aircraft or ships operating outside Cuban territory.

Incidents of Cuban attack on U.S. forces operating outside Cuban territory, which are considered most likely, would involve aircraft engaged in reconnaissance efforts, but also could involve U.S. shipping and cases where lives of U.S. nationals or national interests are in jeopardy. Should attacks occur, for example, south of western Cuba and north of eastern Cuba, the en route time for U.S. fighter support can be reduced by 10 to 30 minutes, with a comparable increase in time for action at the scene, by routing over Cuban territory. This quicker en route reaction time could be the difference between providing an effective defense for U.S. interests and arriving too late for action.

In light of the fact that occasions may arise where the presence of U.S. forces on the scene with least possible delay would be in the best national interests, a draft statement of policy which would authorize overflight of Cuban territory in certain instances, and under certain conditions, has been prepared and is attached. The draft policy has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, coordinated with the Department of State and, based on the recommendation of that Department, delineates the individuals in the military chain of command authorized to approve overflights of Cuban territory.

I recommend its approval.

Attachment

STATEMENT OF POLICY ON US ACTION IN EVENT OF CUBAN ATTACK ON US AIRCRAFT/SHIPS (U)

The following policy is issued pertaining to US action in the event of Cuban attack in the area surrounding Cuba against US aircraft/ships:

a. In specific instances in which adherence to international airspace would delay significantly the arrival of US fighter aircraft at the scene of a Cuban attack against US aircraft/ships operating outside of Cuban territory, overflight of Cuba by fighter aircraft is authorized subject to the following:

(1) It must be established that the US aircraft/ship is being attacked, or the US aircraft/ship has been attacked and lives of US personnel are endangered.

(2) Overflight times are minimized with due regard to risk to aircraft. While en route every effort will be taken to avoid provocative acts. Engagement will not be undertaken during the overflight except for self-defense against aircraft attack.

(3) From the time of arrival at the scene current rules of engagement will pertain, with return to home or diversion airfield via air space over international waters, if practicable.

(4) The most expeditious means possible will be used to inform highest national authorities that overflight of Cuba has been directed, and details on the action shall be furnished in the same manner.

b. Decision to overfly Cuban territory may be delegated to but not below the level of Commander Naval Base, Key West and Commander Naval Base, Guantanamo.

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 330-77-131, OSD Misc.—1963. Top Secret; Sensitive. This memorandum was undated and unsigned, but it was attached to an August 20 memorandum from Califano to Gilpatric recommending that the Deputy Secretary send it to the President. On August 26 Bundy sent Gilpatric a memorandum indicating that the President had signed this memorandum on August 22. The President asked Gilpatric to undertake the Top Secret and Sensitive distribution of this addition to rules of engagement.
1. See Document 290.