331. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk 0

SUBJECT

  • Probable Soviet Reaction to Low-level Flights Over Cuba

Obviously, Soviet reaction to low-level flights over Cuba would be affected by a number of factors, such as timing and scope. The reaction to a one-shot mission would be far less than that to a sustained series. Also, if the flights were such that they were widely known in Cuba, the reaction would be stronger than it would in the case of a single mission in an isolated area. Soviet reaction would, to some extent, be affected by Castro’s reaction, which I should think would be quite strong, particularly as indicated above if knowledge of the flights was widespread.

So far as timing is concerned, the present would appear to be an extremely unfavorable time. Castro is in Moscow and will be there apparently for several weeks. It is assumed that he is putting the squeeze on the Soviets for more economic aid and low-level flights would put him in a position both to press the Soviets for some radical action such as firing on a U-2 flight, or at least would increase his leverage to get more economic assistance, as well as possibly to cancel or slow down any intended removal of Soviet troops.

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In addition, it would appear that the Soviet Government is in the process of making a number of important decisions which could be affected by low-level flights. These include determination of Soviet policy on Laos, a general review of Soviet policy toward the United States specifically, as well as probable negotiations with the Chinese Communists over Communist Bloc policy as a whole. There would appear to be sufficient evidence to believe that Khrushchev has been having a difficult time recently, and it is quite possible that he would read into low-level flights an intention on the part of the United States to proceed vigorously to bring down Castro, which, if accomplished in a short period of time, would put him in an almost impossible situation in maintaining his leadership position and in withstanding pressures to turn Soviet policy in the direction desired by the Chinese Communists. In addition, there are important decisions pending on internal affairs which will probably be taken at the meeting of the Central Committee on May twenty-eighth.

Finally, there are some indications that Khrushchev may be having trouble with his own military, and, if so, low-level flights at this time might give the military ammunition to force a change of policy, or even challenge Khrushchev’s leadership. Whatever the decision on low-level flights in general, I should think that the next six weeks would be about the worst possible time in which to take this action.

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Secret. A note on this memorandum indicates it was part of the President’s weekend reading, May 11.