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  4. Document 329

329. Agenda for the April 30 Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security Council0

Washington, April 29, 1963.

I have not been able to make special assignments to individual members of the group in this first week, but I have had helpful discussions with several members, and I know that other members have had conversations with each other. What I hope we can do tomorrow is to fill out the outline which follows of major areas of interest, and to make preliminary decisions as to ways and means of getting forward with the necessary spade work.

1.
The possible use of contingencies for the achievement of wider political objectives. Illustrations which come to mind here are:
a.
Interference with overflights.
b.
Possible death of Castro.
c.
The occurrence of revolt or repression in the manner of Hungary.1
d.
Attributable interference by Castro2 in other countries.
e.
Reintroduction of offensive weapons.
2.
Programs which might be initiated by the United States Government with both immediate and long-rUN objectives. Examples which come to mind are:
a.
Greater pressure against the Soviet presence, perhaps by additional OAS resolutions and then naval action to interrupt all military traffic to Cuba.3
b.
Expanded economic action,4 possibly including encouragement of cooperative sabotage on a much larger scale than anything attempted up until now. Within this category additional possible gambits are of great interest to higher authority and it is hoped that some may be offered.5
3.
The possible defection of Castro. This is a wholly separate kind of undertaking and there seemed to be considerable agreement last week that it was not very promising, but it has been properly pointed out that it [Page 795] could be pursued on a separate track while some or all of the things proposed above were going on.6
4.
An information program for post-Castro Cuba. There was general agreement last week that this also is a matter of high importance and that it could be pursued independently of decisions in other categories.

Documents which members may want to look at before the meeting are attached:7

  • Tab A: Draft intelligence estimate of the situation in Cuba a year from now.
  • Tab B: The first outline of an OAS Resolution about the Soviet military presence. This item is of considerable present interest to higher authority.

It is recognized that the diet here is relatively thin, but I think we can usefully spend one more meeting making sure that we have the elements of the problem in proper shape before we go into more detailed work.8

McGeorge Bundy9
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Standing Committee 4/63. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Prepared by McGeorge Bundy.↩
  2. At this point Bundy wrote, “Cubans vs Cubans.”↩
  3. After Castro Bundy wrote, “or USSR.”↩
  4. In the left margin of this paragraph Bundy wrote, “President.” In the right margin he wrote, “talk to him hard?”↩
  5. Next to this paragraph Bundy wrote, “sugar, POL, money.”↩
  6. Bundy added by hand paragraph c which reads: “Appraisal of small-scale sabotage over a long period.”↩
  7. Next to this paragraph Bundy placed a bullet.↩
  8. Not printed.↩
  9. At the end of the agenda Bundy wrote, “levels of attribution.”↩
  10. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩