Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

325. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, April 25, 1963.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Relations with the Present Cuban Revolutionary Council

Miro’s resignation and the accompanying withdrawal of most of the CRC componentorganizations and personalities has converted the CRC into a rump organization of little attraction in the exile community. This CRC remnant, which within itself is divided, essentially constitutes “Tony” Varona’s effort to preserve his personal political machine, established through his control over the years of fifty per cent of the U.S.-supplied CRC funds. Varona, who lacks wide support, is actively seeking adhesion from a wide variety of exile leaders including Batista elements. We doubt that unity of the exiles under present circumstances is an achievable goal. The highly individualistic Cubans, who were really not “unified” in the pre-Castro era, are usually not inclined to submerge differences and organize themselves. The frustrations of exile life in general and the absence of “proof that Castro’s end is in sight” in particular combine to aggravate rather than decrease differences.

The CRC has been receiving $137,000 monthly. In addition, seven exile organizations (some of which are CRC members) receive a total of $103,500 monthly. The next monthly installment of U.S. financial assist-ance is due the CRC on May 1. While some possibility exists that the CRC may dissolve of its own accord before May 1, its demise would be virtually certain were U.S. aid withheld. If the CRC disappeared, some of its present and many of its former component organizations would require our financial assistance to enable us to accomplish the intelligence, propaganda and other clandestine tasks we have set.

In causing the CRC rump to disappear by withholding the May installment we would:

1. Reduce substantially our intimate involvement in exile politics.

2. Sever our relationship with an unrepresentative exile group, thus avoiding charges of imposing our will on the exile community.

3. Enhance the possibility of the eventual emergence of a more widely supported exile leader by enabling exile political forces to operate more freely.

4. Avoid the possibility of a “Miro resignation” recurring at a more inopportune time from the domestic political standpoint.

5. Create the opportunity for an unencumbered review in depth of what our basic policy toward the exiles should be.

6. Incur criticism from some sectors of the exile community and of U.S. public opinion that we were engaging in further “persecution” of the exiles.

Temporizing with the CRC by provisionally extending its life for another month or so would increase the difficulty of disengaging later.

On balance, the Department recommends:¹

1. that the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs at Miami be authorized to inform CRC officials before May 1 that while we wish to maintain cordial relations with exile leaders and continue to consult them frequently, we do not believe that the CRC as presently constituted warrants continued U.S. financial support. Discontinuance of salaries would be accomplished gracefully, i.e. accompanied by notice and lump sum termination payments.

2. that certain former and present CRC componentorganizations essential to achieving our intelligence and other missions continue to receive U.S. financial assistance.

Dean Rusk²

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30-2 Cuba. Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch, and cleared by Cottrell, Martin, and Ball.
1. A note at the top of the source text indicates Chase called from the White House to say that this memorandum was “O.K.” and the decision to call off aid had been made. Chase stated that “something should be done for Varona.”
2. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was signed by Rusk.