312. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev 0
Dear Mr. Chairman: It has been some time since I have written you directly, and I think it may be helpful to have some exchange of views in this private channel.1 As we have both earlier agreed, it is of great importance that we should try to understand each other clearly, so that we can avoid unnecessary dangers or obstacles to progress in the effort for peaceful agreements.
[Here follow the President’s remarks on the test ban treaty and the spread of nuclear weapons; the full text of the letter is in volume VI, pages 265–268.]
Although together we found workable arrangements for ending the very dangerous crisis which was created when strategic weapons were introduced into Cuba last year, I am sure we can agree that the situation in that island is not yet satisfactory or reassuring to those who care for the peace of the Caribbean. Although the recent withdrawal of a number of your forces has been an important contribution to the reduction of tension, the continued presence of Soviet forces in Cuba can never be regarded with equanimity by the people of this Hemisphere and therefore further withdrawals of such forces can only be helpful.
Meanwhile, we on our side have been endeavoring to reduce tension in this area in a number of ways. For example, the fundamental justification of our practice of peaceful observation of Cuba is precisely that it is necessary to prevent further increase in tension and a repetition of the dangers of last fall. Without such peaceful observation in 1962, this Hemisphere would have been confronted with intolerable danger, and the people of the Hemisphere could not now accept a situation in which they were without adequate information on the situation in Cuba. It is for this reason that this peaceful observation must continue, and that any interference with it from Cuba would necessarily evoke whatever response was necessary to retain it.
We are also aware of the tensions unduly created by recent private attacks on your ships in Caribbean waters; and we are taking action to [Page 760] halt those attacks which are in violation of our laws, and obtaining the support of the British Government in preventing the use of their Caribbean islands for this purpose. The efforts of this Government to reduce tensions have, as you know, aroused much criticism from certain quarters in this country. But neither such criticism nor the opposition of any sector of our society will be allowed to determine the polices of this Government. In particular, I have neither the intention nor the desire to invade Cuba; I consider that it is for the Cuban people themselves to decide their destiny. I am determined to continue with policies which will contribute to peace in the Caribbean.
[Here follows a brief call for U.S.-Soviet cooperation on Laos.]
There are other issues and problems before us, but perhaps I have said enough to give you a sense of my own current thinking on these matters. Let me now also offer the suggestion that it might be helpful if some time in May I should send a senior personal representative to discuss these and other matters informally with you. The object would not be formal negotiations, but a fully frank, informal exchange of views, arranged in such a way as to receive as little attention as possible. If this thought is appealing to you, please let me know your views on the most convenient time.
In closing, I want again to send my warm personal wishes to you and all your family. These are difficult and dangerous times in which we live, and both you and I have grave responsibilities to our families and to all of mankind. The pressures from those who have a less patient and peaceful outlook are very great—but I assure you of my own determination to work at all times to strengthen world peace.2
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence, Vol. IV-A, 1/4/63-4/11/63. Top Secret; Eyes Only; No Distribution.↩
- In an April 11 memorandum to Rusk, Thompson stated that when delivering this message to Dobrynin on April 11 at 2 p.m., he told the Soviet Ambassador: “I wished to underscore one point in the message, and said that in doing so, I knew I was reflecting the views of my highest superiors, and that was the usefulness of continued withdrawal of troops from Cuba.” (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, Special US-USSR Files)↩
- Printed from an unsigned copy.↩