Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

87. Operation Order From the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison) to the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark)⁰

CINCLANTFLT No. 25-61

Norfolk, April 10, 1961.

[Here follows the text of Operation Order 25-61, Annex A, and Appendix I to Annex A. The operation order outlines the units involved in the operation, the overall situation and intent of the operation, the type of friendly and unfriendly forces involved, and the tasks to be undertaken. Annex A briefly outlines the Concept of Operations, including the stipulation that “U.S. Naval vessels and aircraft will not enter Cuban Territorial Waters or airspace (three mile limit).” Appendix I to Annex A presents, in outline form, with scheduled times listed, a detailed Table of Events from the point at which the Cuban Expeditionary Force was scheduled to embark to the transfer to landing craft off the coast of Cuba.]

Appendix II to Annex A

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. DDʼs assigned to provide area coverage of the CEF will avoid overt association with the CEF ships¹ as follows:

(a) During daylight hours. Maintain maximum practicable range ahead of CEF ships and use patrol courses and speeds to provide protection but not appear to be screening the CEF.

(b) During hours of darkness. DDʼs may take station with respect to the CEF ships to provide adequate protection.

(c) DDʼs will not be used to support the landing operation and will not close within 20 miles of the objective area. After withdrawal of TG 81.8.4 from Point Oldsmobile² all DDʼs will proceed to join CTG 81.8.

2. Surface and sub-surface rules of engagement as follows:

(a) Prior to rendezvous of CEF ships at Point Zulu:³

(1) If intervention by US forces is required to protect the CEF ships from surface attack or to prevent their capture, US forces will intervene as necessary to protect the CEF ship(s).

(2) This intervention will cancel the landing operation and TG 81.8 ships will take measures short of firing on CEF ships to cause them to withdraw to a port to be designated by the JCS upon receipt of the report of intervention.

(3) Subsequent to intervention and withdrawal, TG 81.8 DDʼs will maintain close escort of the CEF ships to provide protection and witness compliance with the withdrawal order.

(4) US forces will open fire only if CEF ship(s) is attacked.

(b) After rendezvous of CEF ships at Point Zulu on D-1 Day and until convoy has moved to a point within 20 miles of the objective area, a DD commanding officer will:

(1) Place his ship between the convoy and any suspicious or Castro surface craft sighted.

(2) Warn the craft not to approach within gun range of the convoy.

(3) If the surface craft persists in closing the convoy, the DD will intervene as necessary to protect the CEF ships, then follow the instructions set forth in paragraph 2 (a) (2) and (3) above.

(c) Intervention by TG 81.8 DDʼs after the CEF convoy has moved to a point within 20 miles of the objective area will be limited to that required to assist CTU 81.8.4 at his request.

3. The CAP pilots and air controllers will be instructed as follows:

(a) CAP will be stationed so that it will not appear to be covering the CEF ships.

(b) Air rules of engagement are as follows:

(1) Any unidentified aircraft approaching within radar range of CEF ships and closing will be investigated.

(2) If investigation reveals the aircraft to be Castroʼs, the investigating aircraft will make successive close passes ensuring that the Castro aircraft is aware of his presence.

(3) If Castro aircraft maintains course to close CEF ship(s), CAP will continue to make close passes in an attempt to divert.

(4) If Castro aircraft commences firing on the CEF ship(s) or opens its bomb bays and commences a bomb run, CAP will open fire.

Robert L. Dennison⁴
Admiral, U.S. Navy

[Here follow Appendix III to Annex A, which outlines reference points; Annex B, which deals with communications; and Annex C, which briefly summarizes intelligence relating to the operation.]

0. Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Limited Distribution; CO Eyes Only/By Hand. The order was signed for Dennison by Vice Admiral Fitzhugh Lee. Special Task Group 81.8 was commanded by Rear Admiral John E. Clark. The Task Group was composed of: Carrier Unit 81.8.1, USS Essex (CVS-9); Destroyer Unit 81.8.2, commanded by Captain G. M. Slonim, composed of USS Waller (DDE-466), USS Conway (DDE-507), USS Cony (DDE-508), USS Eaton (DDE-510), USS Bache (DDE-470), USS Beale (DDE-471), and USS Murray (DDE-576); Convoy Escort Unit 81.8.3, commanded by Captain R. P. Crutchfield, composed of USS Eaton (DDE-510) and USS Murray (DDE-576); Amphibious Support Unit 81.8.4, commanded by Commander R. Cousins, composed of USS San Marcos (LSD-25); and Replenishment Unit 81.8.8, com-manded by Captain P.K. Blesh, composed of USS Elokomin (AO-55).
1. The ships of the Cuban Expeditionary Force were identified in Operation Order 25-61 as Blagar and Barbara J, which were described as ex-U.S. Navy LCIs, SS Caribe, SS Atlantico, SS Houston, and SS Rio Escondido, identified as WW II Liberty hulls, but it was subsequently established that they were not. The LCIs would be flying Nicaraguan ensigns and the merchant ships would be flying Liberian ensigns.
2. Appendix III to Annex A gives the coordinates for the codeworded reference points listed in the operation order. Point Oldsmobile is 22-01.5N, 81-02W.
3. The coordinates for Point Zulu are not given in the operation order.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.