124. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 0
In your NSC talk next Tuesday,1 could you say a few words about our policy toward the major neutrals? These are words best said privately at this juncture but words which need saying nonetheless. Many officials, some high up, get so annoyed at the words and antics of a Sukarno and a Nasser that they question the underlying rationale of our policy shift.
Yet I am convinced that one of the major potential successes of your Administration may flow from our more flexible policy toward the Nehrus, Nassers, Sukarnos, Ben Bellas, and their ilk. This marks a genuine departure from previous policy (though the last Administration was gradually shifting in this direction). We are still in the early phases of this enterprise and it isn’t yet paying great dividends. But if we look on it as a long-term investment, and remain undisturbed by any short-term fluctuations, it will eventually show real capital gains.
To me, the underlying rationale for this policy is that in the game of competitive co-existence, we can hardly afford to let the major neutralists become clients primarily of Moscow. The Soviets have made a major effort in this direction, but with the glittering exception of India, we have only recently begun to compete.
Regrettably, the benefits of such a policy take less the form of visible support for US positions than the largely negative form of refraining from actions which would be most unfavorable to our interests. Yet, if we think Nasser is misbehaving in the Yemen or Sukarno again showing undue territorial appetite, we need merely ask ourselves how much more difficult they would be if they didn’t feel a real concern lest they sacrifice actual and prospective aid from us. The trouble is that this is hardly a convincing public rationale for giving aid.
Other problems arise from the simple fact that the policies of Nasser or Sukarno cut across those of many other US friends; hence we are constantly put in the position of being asked to choose between them. It would be simpler, for example, to choose up sides in Yemen than to take the present middle road. Yet to do so would cost us more with one side than we would gain with the other. Similarly, in Southeast Asia, why spend billions containing Communist pressures on the mainland while leaving the Communists a free hand in the rich archipelago behind?
[Page 457]Those who cavil over our Nasser or Sukarno policy also ignore the absence of any realistic alternative. We tried to get rid of Sukarno in 58—and failed. Unless we think we can do so again we simply have to sweat him out. This is not to advocate an exclusively soft approach, but to use the stick without the carrot has failed again and again (as with the Aswan Dam).
It failed because it ran athwart of the strong nationalist attitudes of the new Afro-Asian countries. Yet this very nationalism, which to date has naturally focused on the former colonial powers and their associates, will increasingly bring them into conflict with an expansionist Bloc. This has already happened in India, where it was Peiping’s blunder (plus our skill in capitalizing on it) which has led to a shift in India’s attitude toward them and us. This will happen elsewhere if we let it mature. Time is on side here.
A few words on this policy would forestall any misreading of your tactical interest in sharp words or actions when needed.2
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, 508th NSC Meeting. Secret.↩
- January 22; see Document 125.↩
- In a January 21 memorandum to the President suggesting topics for the next day’s NSC meeting, Bundy wrote that he agreed with Komer “that we should be strong in our assistance in competing for the neutrals, using both carrot and stick,” and attached Komer’s “strong memorandum” to his own. (Kennedy Libarary, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, 508th NSC Meeting)↩