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  4. Document 99

99. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting1

Washington , September 12, 1963, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Vietnam

PRESENT

  • Secretary Rusk
  • Secretary McNamara
  • Mr. McCone
  • Mr. Gilpatric
  • The Attorney General
  • Mr. Bundy
  • Governor Harriman
  • Mr. Colby
  • Mr. Hilsman
  • Ambassador Nolting
  • Mr. Forrestal
  • Mr. Mendenhall
  • Mr. Phillips
  • Mr. Mecklin
  • Mr. Murrow
  • General Krulak
1.
The Group initially read a CIA summary2 of all the messages which had come in over the past two days. The summary was considered to be so valuable that Mr. McCone was asked if he could bring it up to date daily, and include within it a list of indicators of major change. Examples were how many Buddhists remain imprisoned; students imprisoned; changes in martial law, curfew, etc.
2.
Mr. Bundy opened the meeting by referring to General Harkins’ message where he stated that the Communists had deeply infiltrated the Buddhists and students.3 Mr. McCone stated that CIA had little specific information on the matter. Mr. Rusk observed that under any circumstance the government would claim that this was the case, while the Communists would certainly seek to invade these movements. Mr. McNamara stated that we would query General Harkins to determine factual background on the report that there is Communist motivation and control in the Buddhist/student movements.
3.
With respect to political orientation of the Buddhists, Ambassador Nolting stated that in early July one of the bonzes came to CIA and asked who the U.S. would like to see as President when they overthrew Diem.
4.
Mr. McNamara asked that the Group consider what we really want Diem to do, stating that it is important that these points be listed. He mentioned such things as the removal of censorship and relaxation of military law. Mr. Bundy added that actions of over-repression, such as hauling truck-loads of people to jail, should also be eliminated; and Mr. Rusk added that there should be an end to the arrests of people simply because they oppose the government.
5.
Mr. Rusk asked what progress had been made in the study regarding evacuation of dependents. Mr. Hilsman replied that the working group was developing a plan, which would be reported upon to him tomorrow and to the Executive Committee on Monday.4
6.
The Group then was given a draft message by Secretary Rusk (attached).5 After reading it there was considerable discussion as to the impact of the cable on Ambassador Lodge. It was Mr. Bundy’s view that it would convey a major change in policy, from one of urgent action to one of restrained sequential steps. He stated that no such step should be taken over a week-end. It was generally agreed that Mr. Rusk’s draft message did, in fact, exhibit a major change in thinking here in Washington.
7.
Mr. Bundy observed that there was probably still some divergency in Washington, and in this sense Mr. McNamara suggested that Secretary Rusk’s message seemed to try to bridge that gap, which is not desirable.
8.
It was ultimately agreed that the message would be restudied and, in the meantime, that a brief message be sent to Ambassador Lodge tomorrow stating that his proposals are still under study and that, in the interim, he should go back to Diem to speak about the matter of Madame Nhu, the Senator Church resolution, and the attitude of the U.S. Congress.6
9.
Mr. McCone stated that there are many more things that should be considered, such as sending a personal emissary to Diem; arranging for a meeting between Cardinal Spellman and Archbishop Thuc; sending a personal emissary to Nhu to persuade him to leave the country; seeking to get the Foreign Minister to return; and seeking to get Diem to appoint a military man as Assistant Minister of Defense.7
10.
Mr. Bundy obtained the concurrence of the Group that there is no urgency for sending a major policy message to Ambassador Lodge for the next two or three days.
11.
The Group then read a draft letter from the President to President Diem.8 It was generally agreed that such a letter should be forwarded, although this one required some careful study.
12.
Mr. McNamara observed that transmittal of such a letter should be preceded by agreement here as to our objectives. In discussing objectives, Governor Harriman stated that it had always been his view that we should work on Diem to improve the government, while still seeking to remove Nhu. Mr. Bundy stated that this is unrealistic; [Page 201] that the general judgment is that splitting the brothers will not work. Mr. McNamara observed that the Defense Department viewpoint is not one of personalities, but one of objectives and actions, and again asked if we could not list the elements of an action program. It was then agreed that a check-list of objectives would be developed by the State Department tomorrow. This would be followed by a comprehensive check-list of the pressures to be used to achieve these objectives, to be completed by Monday. With respect to the second list, Mr. McNamara requested, and it was agreed, that the matter of aid pressures would be kept separate from the remainder.
V.H. Krulak
Major General, USMC
  1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-186-69. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Krulak. The meeting was held at the White House.↩
  2. Not found.↩
  3. Document 96.↩
  4. September 16.↩
  5. Document 98.↩
  6. Presumably a reference to telegram 391, Document 97, which was already sent before this meeting began.↩
  7. Regarding the origin of these points, see Document 100.↩
  8. Document 115.↩