75. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
450. CINCPAC for POLAD. Reference: Deptel 354.2 Embassy believes would be preferable omit Tri Quang from discussion on release of bonzes. His strong belief in importance of removing Ngo family (with possible exception Diem) from power render him enemy of regime, which will most probably feel action against him (at least long term detention) necessary for own security. Up to present GVN has not released other top level Buddhist leaders, and Quang may well be regarded by Ngo family as most dangerous of all. As reftel suggests, believe best course under current conditions would be for Quang to leave country. He himself has requested this (Embtel 399).3 As to feasibility, GVN may well believe that oppositionists out of country do not pose significant threat, although in case of Quang, his probable ability to aid in mobilization of international Buddhist opinion against GVN would be factor working against their willingness see him leave.
As to Quang’s leadership potential, Embassy believes this to be considerable. At time of May 8 incident in Hue, Quang demonstrated his complete mastery of crowds on several occasions. In addition to this ability to speak effectively to the public he has impressed Embassy officers by the acuteness of his intelligence and his political awareness. He is in addition self-assured to point of conceit. While in Embassy he has made systematic effort to build himself in our eyes as well as to attempt persuade us to pursue policy conducive to his ends. While his goal has been replacement of key members of Ngo family he has maintained to date that he had not considered in detail how Buddhist tactics (popular agitation) would lead to result desired or whether forces Buddhists setting in motion might not result in overall change for worse. In response to questioning he has limited himself to general statement that in his view VC could not gain control of situation in [Page 137] event of a change and that removal members Ngo family could only be considered change for better. (We are continuing to probe further on this subject.)
Although he has disclaimed idea of himself assuming political leadership, believe it be quite possible that he has in fact entertained idea, but that he has given little or no systematic thought to problems which would be entailed. In short, as oppositionist, Quang possesses very considerable leadership powers; as potential member of government, he has given no basis for an evaluation of his ability, although his basic intelligence, courage, force of personality and political awareness would argue that his leadership potential could be utilized in fields other than religion.
Should of course be borne in mind that both Quang’s physical presence in Embassy and his awareness of US importance as factor in situation lead him to concentrate his efforts on attempt to influence our policy. Therefore possible that many of his statements to us (e.g., anti-Communism, anti-neutralism) may reflect his tactical judgments rather than deeply held convictions.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET. Secret; Immediate. Received at 5:54 a.m. Repeated to CINCPAC. Passed to the White House.↩
- In telegram 354 to Saigon, September 5, the Department of State informed the Embassy that it should not respond in writing to the Government of Vietnam’s request for release of the three Buddhist monks who had received sanctuary in the Embassy. If asked by Diem about release, Lodge should respond that before the United States would consider releasing them it had to be satisfied that South Vietnam was taking positive steps to assure religious tolerance and redress specific Buddhist grievances. The Department also asked if it would not be preferable in the Embassy’s view to exclude Tri Quang from the discussions and to arrange for him to leave South Vietnam. (Ibid.)↩
- Telegram 399, September 2, contained the text of a letter from Tri Quang to Lodge, dated September 1. (Ibid.)↩
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The Department agreed that Tri Quang should be left out of discussions with the Government of Vietnam and conceded that getting him out of the country would be best. The problem was how to do it and where to send him. (Telegram 365 to Saigon, September 9; ibid.)
On September 17 the Embassy reported it had a number of plans for removing Tri Quang, none of which were worth risking at that time. The better course, in the Embassy’s view, was to continue to hold Tri Quang. If a new Vietnamese Government emerged he might play a role in it; if the Diem government continued, then the United States would have to evacuate him without fanfare. (Telegram 531 from Saigon, September 17; ibid.)
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