251. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
208. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 178.2 Had very serious talk with President Diem this morning. I feel he is impressed by gravity of situation confronting him, both internal and external. When he told me that he would take seriously what I had said and would consider what he could do to meet our demands, I told him this was not enough—that time was running out and that he had promised me the same last week. Since then the situation had been made much worse by Madame Nhu’s intemperate utterances. He then promised to let me know this afternoon what he would do.
During course of lengthy conversation (in which I did most of talking), read him reftel word for word, explained points and pointed out inter alia that we were now talking about doubts and misgivings in US Government itself, not in US public opinion. I drew heavily, perhaps exhaustively, on store of goodwill and confidence, spoke absolutely frankly from point of view of partner in joint enterprise, could detect no resentment but rather a great sense of struggle between family loyalties and public duty. In this connection I stressed to him that as President his family is entire Vietnamese people and it must be their welfare which must prevail.
My talk with Diem was preceded by a visit at my home last night by Thuan (please protect source). Thuan summed up the feelings of most Cabinet members and his own by saying that it was the 11th [Page 563] hour for Diem to take charge of the government and to act as President. I have reason to believe that this is an accurate summary of most Cabinet opinion from conversations I have had separately with nearly all of them. I gave President Diem my own observations and convictions regarding the attitude, not only of high officials of his own government, but of many lower Vietnamese; stressed absolute necessity for him to take account personally of the crisis resulting from Buddhist problem. I told him that not only abroad, but here in Viet-Nam, it seemed clear that Madame Nhu, with the support of his brother, was usurping his prerogatives and control in this matter (he vehemently denied this) and that in my opinion and in that of my government nothing would now eradicate that impression except vigorous and positive public action by him, demonstrating his control over his own government and repudiating Madame Nhu.
I will report further after hearing from him.
Another point should be added: Thuan (protect source) told me last evening that he was convinced Madame Nhu had organized a secret police squad of her own, headed by her brother, Tran Van Khiem, and that already “illegal arrests” have been made by this group. I asked him whether Nhu was in on this and he said he found it impossible to believe that he was not. I told Diem that I had received certain unverified information to this effect. He flatly denied that there was any substance to it, saying among other things that he disliked and distrusted Khiem and that his family would never do such a thing. I told him I thought he had better look into it.
Throughout discussion, there was evident on Diem’s part a feeling that it was not so much what Madame Nhu said but how she said it that gave him trouble. He reverted again and again to the bad faith of the bonzes, to their sabotage of the war effort, etc. He also mentioned the pressure he was under from “good people” in the provinces and elsewhere not to knuckle under to the false monks. He complained that nobody in the outside world recognized the falsity of the religious issue or the fact that it was being used for subversive action. I told him that what he had just said confirmed my suspicion that his policy was in fact schizophrenic, that he had entrusted a policy of conciliation to the Vice President to implement and was himself condoning public attacks upon the Buddhists which made that policy impossible to implement; that he had to choose and do so decisively; that so far as the US was concerned he had to stick to and implement fully the policy of conciliation, and had to make certain public demonstrations that he was doing so. Otherwise, we could not support him.
He said that Vice President Tho was scheduled to make a restatement of government policy tomorrow, and that he expected, after talks with certain bonzes, that they would agree to joint investigations of the events in Phan Thiet. I seized upon this to press him most strongly [Page 564] to make that public declaration himself, in his own name and to take advantage of this opportunity to subdue the rising tide of public feeling, at home and abroad, that he is not master of his own government. If he responds at all positively to our demarche, I think it will be to make this declaration himself, as a first step.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 S Viet. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC. According to a note on another copy, this telegram was part of the President’s weekend reading file of August 13. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, 8/1/63-8/20/63)↩
- Document 248.↩