234. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1
Washington, July
23, 1963, 6:51 p.m.
112. For Nolting from Hilsman. As indicated Deptel 104,2 we have carefully considered present Buddhist problem against backdrop successful CI program. Current thinking here on stability Diem regime in general represented by SNIE 53-2-63 (July 10)3 sent you separate cover. We keenly aware of distance which separates us from fast moving situation, and most anxious have your comments on following estimate which represents our present thinking:
- 1.
- We inclined anticipate further Buddhist demonstrations and resulting unrest, and believe more protest suicides should be expected. This view based on: (1) Continuing GVN failure act promptly enough to meet legitimate Buddhist grievances and to show true spirit of conciliation; (2) Belief that Buddhist protest movement likely become increasingly militant. Buddhists probably more and more inclined regard overthrow of regime as only possible solution, thus attracting growing support (and conversely) from other major elements plotting regime’s overthrow, particularly in armed forces.
- 2.
- We also expect that Buddhist unrest and demonstrations will increasingly agitate urban populace, and that this agitation, to degree, may be expected extend to countryside also, with resulting slowdown in war effort.
- 3.
- In these circumstances and in light growing crop of reports on coup plans, we judge odds favor attempted coup within next few months if not weeks.
- 4.
- Odds also seem to favor success of such coup, although we keenly aware of strong possibility the GVN might still successfully weather Buddhist storm by combination conciliation and repression and that consequently coup attempts may fail or abort.
- 5.
- In these circumstances, following courses seem open to us: (a) We can attempt actively influence events by public statements disassociating ourselves from GVN handling of Buddhist issue, with likely result being encouragement or even triggering of coup attempt. (b) We can go even further and seek directly to encourage certain military leaders seek “Constitutional solution” under Tho. (c) Conversely, we can seek actively discourage coup plots by both high-level public statements of support to GVN, and private statements to Buddhist-s and potential coup leaders although this, like the above might have unpredictable results. (d) Finally, we can hold to present posture of watchful waiting while continuing privately to press GVN to demonstrate proper spirit and to take all necessary measures to finally resolve issue.
- 6.
- On balance we continue be inclined favor last course for time being. More active role runs obvious risk of putting us in position of having backed loser, and even of prolonging crisis and increasing violence, with all bad effects on war effort that would flow from such error. We may well come to point where we would want to throw all our influence behind either Diem or an acceptable alternative leader or junta (preferably Constitutional successor supported by military) in order to stabilize situation as rapidly as possible. But in light info now available to us here, we do not believe situation has yet jelled to that point. At this moment, though alternatives to Diem seem to be emerging, it is not yet clear who and what they are.
Rusk