Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

176. Draft Memorandum of Conversation, White House, Washington, May 1, 1962, 11 a.m.¹

White House, Washington, May 1, 1962, 11 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• R. Gilpatric
• General Decker
• General Max Taylor
• Mr. McGeorge Bundy
• Mr. Michael Forrestal
• Governor A. Harriman
• D. FitzGerald
• Ray Cline
• Roger Hilsman

SUBJECTS

• 1) Laos; 2) How are we doing in South Viet-Nam; 3) Is there any merit in J.K. Galbraithʼs suggestion of negotiating a neutralized coalition government for South Viet-Nam

[Here follows a paragraph on Laos.]

2. I was asked to report on how we were doing in South Viet-Nam, and spoke from the INR talking paper² prepared for that purpose. At the end of it, the President raised the question of defoliants saying that he was inclined to think they were not very useful. I said that ambushes are better and more frequently laid under cover of terrain than foliage, but that our problem was going to be with President Diem who seemed to be enamored with the idea of using defoliants against crops.

General Taylor said that he thought there was a great deal of merit in the idea of using defoliants on crops. I argued that the use of defoliants against crops at the present stage of the war would not be very helpful since the Viet Cong still have access to non-communist villages until the strategic village plan had been implemented.

I also argued that there would be a stage in the war when the major rice growing areas were held by the government. At that time, the Viet Cong might have small paddy fields in remote mountain valleys and it might well be desirable to attack these fields. But I thought napalm would be just as efficient as defoliants, since only two or three fields would be involved in any one operation.

General Taylor argued that there was no difference between napalm and defoliants. I disputed this, saying that defoliants were open to germ warfare charges, and that the villagers were receptive because of the propaganda campaign during the Korean War. The President agreed with the latter argument.

It was then noted that an additional experiment with defoliants on 7 miles of road in South Viet-Nam had been approved Friday.³ I suggested that any experiments should be conducted in Thailand. The President approved this recommendation.

3. Ros Gilpatric brought up for discussion Ken Galbraithʼs recommendation⁴ that we negotiate a coalition-type, neutralized South Viet-Nam. Both Harriman and I vigorously opposed this recommendation and the President decided against it.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Laos, 5/1/62-5/10/62. Top Secret. Drafted by Hilsman. The meeting was held at the White House. At the top of the document was a notation by Hilsman that the memorandum of conversation was for INR use only and that it should be placed in his top secret file.
2. Not found.
3. April 27.
4. See Document 141.