137. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France0
309. Following based on uncleared Memorandum of Conversation:
French Ambassador called on Merchant today to discuss coordination of positions prior SC Meeting on the Congo.
Alphand said there would undoubtedly be new attempt by Soviets at tomorrow’s meeting to force immediate withdrawal Belgian forces. He said French position on this matter unchanged, i.e., if proved U.N. forces can assure order and protection lives, Belgian troops should withdraw. He said we should understand between us that this means withdraw to Congo bases, fate of which should be decided subsequently. On Katanga Alphand said French do not wish to recognize now but do not wish to close door. He said French were opposed to entry of U.N. forces into any area of Congo where no disorder existed and it would be unwise to send them in. He expressed approval SYG proposal send civilian emissary to Tshombe to head off his trip to Brussels and New York.
Merchant replied U.S. agreed in general and was opposed to precipitate withdrawal of Belgian forces before U.N. troops are in place. However we believed it would be helpful if there could at least be some symbolic withdrawal before SC Meeting. As regards bases Merchant pointed out situation highly confused since Belgian-Congolese Treaty never ratified.1 He agreed however without prejudice to eventual settlement fate of bases, withdrawal of Belgian troops to them would be a logical first step. On Katanga Merchant said he felt we were in general but not complete agreement with French since consistent U.S. position has been to support unity of Congo. We had therefore replied to Tshombe’s request for recognition that it was out of question now though we had not closed door. Merchant said he believed it would be great mistake if anyone should recognize Katanga now. He believed for time being emissary suggested by Hammarskjold should be sufficient to establish U.N. presence in Katanga but U.S. does not wish to prejudge now question of entry of U.N. forces. He [Page 334] said we could visualize situation where such entry might be useful since strange situation might be created with U.N. successful in establishing order in five provinces, with sixth remaining policed exclusively by Belgians in absence of United Nations.
Alphand emphasized Belgians did not wish U.N. forces where there are no disorders but he agreed this was not urgent problem at moment.
Alphand expressed opinion Congo mutiny could be plot establish Soviet presence Central Africa, making tripartite consultation as well as consultation with Belgians of even greater importance than heretofore. Merchant replied circumstances suspicious but evidence was not conclusive. French also expressed concern presence Guinean troops in U.N. force, particularly Guinean police who they thought would be agitators, thus creating still another problem. In reply to Alphand’s question whether U.S. anticipated Soviet military intervention, Merchant said U.S. would be extremely surprised.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–1960. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Ferguson and cleared by McBride and Executive Secretariat Deputy Director Walter J. Stoessel. Also sent to Brussels, London, and USUN, and pouched to Léopoldville.↩
- Reference is to a Treaty of Friendship signed at Léopoldville, June 29, 1960; for text, see Congo 1960, vol. I, pp. 313–314.↩