Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

342. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal) and Minister of State Roa, Havana, July 23, 1959¹

Havana, July 23, 1959

I called on Dr. Roa by arrangement. In the course of the preliminary exchange of courtesies, he was good enough to say that he had heard on all sides favorable expressions about my mission here, and he gave me a friendly personal message from Fidel Castro, with whom he had just been talking. We agreed that in the present state of Cuban-American relations it was extremely important for us to see each other frequently and to talk frankly. I stated that I hoped to have an opportunity, with Dr. Roa, to call on Dr. Castro at an early date. He agreed that he would arrange this. I then said that I would like to go over certain aspects of our current relations. He permitted me to do so and listened carefully, with few or no interruptions, to the statements which I made to him on the following subjects:

1. U.S. Attitude Toward Cuban Revolution. I told the Minister of State that there is general sympathy in the United States for the objectives of the Cuban Revolution as we understand them. After all, honesty in Government, faithful payment of taxes, representative democracy, etc. are goals toward which we have made a great deal of progress. Also, we have consistently favored and contributed to sound programs of agrarian reform. We believe in equality of opportunity in such things as education, health and service to the community. As a working democracy we sympathize with people seeking democratic ends. And we recognize that there have been many conditions and practices in Cuba, political and economic, which can be improved.

2. U.S. Policy Toward Cuba. I said to the Minister that I was now going to make a statement which I had never found it necessary to make in my 20 years of diplomatic service. I wished him to know most emphatically that the U.S. Government policy toward Cuba has been entirely correct and faithful to the highest principles of international relations between friendly peoples. I told him that I was making this statement because of the atmosphere which had been created around the Diaz Lanz case by certain Cuban Government officials and by the press of the July 26 Movement. I said that I was also led to make this statement by the words pronounced by Dr. Castro when he appeared on television on July 17² (the evening President Urrutia resigned). At that time, Dr. Castro said that he supposed that if President Urrutia were to try to form a cabinet he could get some “agentes norteamericanos” to serve in that cabinet. The Minister of State commented that he had heard that the U.S. Navy had had something to do with Diaz Lanz’ escape from Cuba. I denied this absolutely.

3. Communism. I told the Minister of State that there appeared to be two kinds of anti-Communism prevalent at this time. One of these is the anti-Communism of people who consider their interests threatened by social or political change and who for various motives endeavor to attach the Communist label to the advocates of such change. On the other hand, the more extreme advocates of social change, including the Communists, tend to smear the conservative elements with such labels as “exploiters of the people”, “blood suckers,” etc. This sort of thing is familiar to anyone who has witnessed political and social conflicts. It was certainly prevalent during the early days of our New Deal. Objective observers tend to discount it.

On the other hand, I said to the Minister, there is the anti-Communism which reflects the fight of free peoples everywhere against the conspiracy of international Communism directed from the U.S.S.R. It is the cause for which thousands of young Americans died in Korea, immense defense burdens have been assumed by the American people, and our young people devote two or three years of their lives to military service. It is the cause currently symbolized by Berlin and the Soviet Union’s attempt to increase its slave population. I added that ignorance of this cause and indifference to its importance on the part of our friends in Cuba was a source of great concern to us and to U.S. public opinion.

The Minister commented that he personally was strongly opposed to Communism and that he believed there were no Communists in important Government positions. He recalled the fact that Batista had tried to call him a Communist but that he had been able to prove, thereby avoiding arrest, that he had been violently attacked by the Communist press.

I said that, of course there were people in influential positions and I mentioned Raul Castro and Ché Guevara who by their strongly anti-American pronouncements were playing the Communist game. I referred briefly to the alleged interview published by the New China News Agency with Raul Castro (Department’s telegram 67 of July 17³) and expressed the hope that this was not a correct rendering of what Major Castro had said but rather just another Communist maneuver.

I expressed awareness of the frequently expressed non-Communist sentiments of Fidel Castro and of other people in Government positions.

4. Cuban-American Relations. I told the Minister that I was very much concerned at the deterioration in relations between our two peoples. I said that I believed that this had been fundamentally due to the anti-American attitudes taken in public statements by Fidel Castro and other Cuban Government leaders since January 1, with the exception, of course, of the period during which Castro was in the United States and shortly thereafter. I said that we are also a people with pride, “amor propio” and also quite a bit of sentimentality. I said that our pride and “amor propio” had been wounded and our sentiments outraged by these statements. I said that, of course, I understood that some of these statements did not reflect reasoned positions but rather the first exuberance of the early days of the revolution.

I then added, however, that I had been much concerned at the way in which the Diaz Lanz incident as well as the incident involving the Cuban Consul in Miami had been handled in the Party press and by Government leaders. I added that in both cases I had been ready and willing to obtain necessary information and that, of course, the Department of State had been similarly disposed. Instead, however, both Cuban Government officials, including Dr. Hart in the Miami case and Dr. Castro in the Diaz Lanz case, and the Party press in both cases had launched in public versions of these matters such as to incite and stimulate anti-American feelings among the Cuban people.

Speaking of the Miami incident, I said that this had involved certain Cuban elements who had apparently chosen our National holiday to settle some private scores. I said that the incident took place on our territory and under the jurisdiction of our authorities and that I thought that the least that could have been done here was to suspend judgment until a full report of what took place was available. The Miami police had been condemned by Cubans who had shown a strong anti-American predisposition without hearing the evidence in the case.

With regard to the Diaz Lanz case, I said that I was convinced that both Dr. Castro and the writers of Revolucion were fully aware of our system of Government and of the independence of its various branches. Nevertheless, in public statements everything possible had been done to put the U.S. Government in the position of conspiring against the Cuban Government. The Minister agreed with me that President Eisenhower’s press statement⁴ on the Diaz Lanz case had put things back into focus here.

I said that it seemed to me regrettable that the attitude of Revolucion which is the newspaper of the 26th of July Movement should, on many occasions, be scarely distinguishable from that of Hoy, the Communist paper, in dealing with the U.S. Government and people.

5. Caribbean Situation. I discussed the Caribbean situation along the lines that while Dr. Roa was making a brilliant defense of his country’s position in the OAS and reaffirming the principles of non-intervention and adherence to treaty obligations, there seemed to be a growing belief that recent expeditions against Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic had been organized and equipped in Cuba. Dr. Roa reaffirmed in strong terms that he was convinced that the Cuban Government had not been involved in such expeditions, and that he had been so assured by Dr. Castro himself. (In this connection, I understand that Dr. Castro told Herbert Matthews on about July 7⁵ that, since the recent expeditions against the Dominican Republic had failed so badly, he was not going to lend any further assistance to that cause.) I think that it might be that the Minister is uninformed in these matters.

We discussed at some length how democracy is achieved and maintained. I said that I did not believe that democracy can spring from any other source except the will of a people and the disposition of that people in sufficient numbers to perform the hard work needed to make a democratic system function.

6. American Private Interests in Cuba. I told Dr. Roa that many American private interests in Cuba have made great contributions to the country’s economy in the agricultural field; many of our sugar and cattle enterprises have created employment and wealth where previously there was neither population nor production. These companies are entitled to considerate treatment even though the right of the Cuban Government and people to change existting principles of land tenure is not questioned. I referred also to the public utilities companies and to the importance of finding an arrangement which will permit these companies to continue to obtain the capital which they must have in order to meet the requirements of the expanding Cuban economy. I said that it was unfortunate that in the Cuban Government’s public pronouncements these companies tended to be treated as public enemies, and that as in the case of the recent interventions of cattle ranches, they were pushed around in an arbitrary fashion. I stated that I thought these companies should be heard with regard to matters affecting them before action was taken. I reiterated the general terms of our note on Agrarian Reform.⁶

7. Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Santiago. Dr. Roa assured me that he expects to go to this meeting. He referred in most cordial and friendly terms to Ambassador Dreier and said that he was in full agreement with Ambassador Dreier’s views on the agenda. He appeared to doubt whether Dr. Castro would to [go] to this meeting.

8. Security of American Embassy in Habana. I informed the Minister of State that on about June 26 Acting Minister Hart had told me that Batistianos and Trujillistas were plotting a physical attack on me in order to discredit the Cuban Government. I added that obviously the Communists would be delighted to provoke any kind of incident which would cause friction and misunderstanding between Cuba and the United States. In addition, I referred to recent developments and incidents which have tended to inflame anti-American feelings here. I stated that I was concerned lest the American Embassy Chancery as well as other American installations might be the victims of incidents over the weekend. I said that I was not asking for any special overt protection nor did I plan to give any public indication of alarm of the situation. I asked, however, that the Minister see that adequate measures were taken by Cuban security forces so that if any hostile activities should develop they would be adequately taken care of. I referred particularly to the desirability of alerting the 8th Precinct Police Station which is very near the Chancery building. Dr. Roa stated that he would, that same evening, talk to President Dorticós with regard to this and would see that appropriate measures were taken. He agreed with me that publicity would be undesirable either from our side or from his.

In conclusion, I apologized to the Minister for the length of my presentation and expressed regret that the situation should be one in which I was compelled to take such a critical attitude. His response was cordial and friendly. He reiterated the importance of frequent and open discussion if we are to make any progress in improving relations between our two countries. He said that he would probably be seeing Dr. Castro on July 25 and that he would endeavor at that time to make some sort of an arrangement for an interview at which I would have an opportunity of going over these points with him.

Philip W. Bonsal

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/7–2559. Secret; Limit Distribution. Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 135 from Havana, July 25. A summary of the conversation was sent in telegram 213 from Havana, July 23. (ibid., 611.37/7–2359)
2. See Document 338.
3. See footnote 3, Document 337.
4. See Document 327.
5. See Document 334.
6. See Document 318.