Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

155. Letter From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (Williams) to the Secretary of Defense’s Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale)¹

Saigon, May 9, 1960.

Dear Ed: Yours of 30 Apr² was very informative and gave me a more detailed picture than I’d rec’d from “Jerry.” Incidentally, it only arrived today and after my query to you of the 7th and your reply of the 8th.³

I’m not too surprised at the local reaction to your visit and had guessed local people had been asked if you should come and had replied in the negative. I’d come to this thought knowing that your visit here with the Draper sub-committee had not been rec’d with shouts of joy. Locally you are considered a bad fellow because of your prior close association with Diem!

My “dumbness” stems from several basic causes. Too close association with Diem; my refusal to say “yes” when I think its to the best interest of the U.S. to say “no” this in spite of yelling, cursing and other verbal abuse; the lately published Mansfield Report that drew unfavorable comparison between MAAG on the one hand and USOM & Emb on the other (this was really the kiss of death).

Specific examples:

I objected to forcing the GVN to placing the Civil Guard under the Dept of Interior. My reason being Interior was neither organized nor capable of handling the job; two logistical and school systems had to be set up, one for the Military under DOD & the other for the C.G. under Interior, the country was too poor in leadership and money to have two systems. My fears have proven to be true. With full knowledge of all concerned I requested the US to give 5000 Thompson SMG’s to the C.G. This was approved and I told USOM and the Emb and Diem. I was given a written reprimand⁴ for telling Diem that the news should be held from him until we could gain the proper “political impact.” My only defense was that I’d gotten the weapons to help the poorly equipped C.G. and not for a political hammer.

At the instigation of the Br Amb ours started plugging for deactivation of the Field Command Hqs; the Corps Hqs and the Division Hqs. That the Army should consist only of individual Battalions or at most Regimental size units. In fact it was reported that Diem agreed to this privately. Not believing this report to be true I caused Diem to discuss this proposal at a meeting attended by the Amb., Gen. White⁵ and myself. At this meeting Diem stated he was well pleased with the Org of the Army and wouldn’t change it.⁶ This in fact called the man a liar in public. However the pressure to deactivate these Hqs remains on. The stated purpose now is to reduce expenditures. Also as it is well known there will be no outside aggression! The savings of funds stems from the 1960 Mil budget. The budget has been reduced 32 M US dollars under my guidance since 1956. However I set 169.1 as absolute minimum for 1960. This a decrease from 174.8 M for 1959. However, the Amb, had a Mr. Mendenhall of his office go over the budget and reduce it to a flat 165 million. Now that this has been done they realize instead of supporting a force of 150,000 we have money only for about 143,000. Therefore savings must be generated somewhere and deactivation of various Hqs (which in effect puts us back organization-wise to about 1955) is considered by them the way to do it. Naturally I can’t agree and say no when I’m supposed to say “yes.”

When we were in Wash, in Aug. of last year the Congressional Committees treated me kindly. When McGee & Gore were here they talked very rough to others but again kindly to me. Gore even made the remark “if the Pres should nominate you for a 4th Star I’d be the first to stand up in the Senate and say give it to him.” This didn’t appeal to the others and was left out of the record. However, the real blow came when [the] Mansfield Report was published.

Mr. Thuan told me that when a high State official recently visited Vietnam he asked Thuan if he had read the Mansfield Report. Thuan told him no, although he had. This official then remarked that the report had overplayed the matter and that “they” (i.e. State) didn’t consider MAAG as good as shown in the report. At the same time he asked Thuan if the GVN was fully satisfied with me and the work MAAG was doing. Receiving an affirmative answer he then asked that since there was to be no war in SE Asia were the GVN satisfied with the present organization of the VN Armed Forces. He again received an affirmative. Thuan told me this in all secrecy, just as I tell it to you in secret. Thuan expressed great disgust that these comments and questions had been put to him.

On my return from CINCPAC conference on 25 Apr I found a written requirement from the Amb written in poisonous language requiring a report on VN training over past 4 years.⁷ That report is still in process of being prepared⁸ and it will take many hours to do it.

When Stump was here he had dinner with the Pres & Mrs. Nhu and Mrs. Stump at Dalat the same night I got back from Honolulu.⁹

During the conversation after dinner the Pres told Stump he believed they were out to get me and appealed to Stump to do something about it.¹⁰

So that very briefly is the story. Director of USOM¹¹ has gone home on 2 months leave. I believe there is a question in the need of his family as to whether or not he will return although he told me he would be back in July. Durbrow is due for home leave in July and I now believe he wants to oust me prior to his departure. Although I’m due to leave (for retirement) last of August he may succeed. Maybe he thinks he won’t be back.

Another unfortunate incident occurred. The pick and shovel men for Gore & McGee suggested privately that I should remain in Gov. service after retirement. This was picked up by a service journal which made the suggestion that I might be named as Amb to some country. This item has without doubt come to Emb attention as I’ve received letters about it from many officers around the world. It was a fantastic idea but maybe they believe it and are doing their best to see that it doesn’t come true. I could put their mind at rest if they should ask me!

There are two other items of interest but since this letter is now too long I’ll send them by next mail.

As things written in this letter are delicate they are for your background information and your eyes alone.

Kindest regards,

STW

1. Source: Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Lansdale 1960 (136). Personal and Confidential. Printed from a carbon copy of the handwritten original.
2. Document 148.
3. On May 7 Williams had asked, in a letter to Lansdale, about the prospects for Lansdale’s trip. On the same day Lansdale had replied, in an unnumbered telegram (apparently received in Saigon on May 8), that there were “still some questions about making visit” on the part of the Department of State and of CINCPAC. (Both Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Lansdale 1960 (136))
4. Not found.
5. General I.D. White, Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific.
6. Generals White and Williams and Ambassador Durbrow met with President Diem on February 23, 1960. It is not certain that this is the conversation referred to as Diem is not described in the memorandum of the conversation by Lieutenant Colonel Foster of MAAG as expressing such unequivocal satisfaction with the existing organization of ARVN. Diem is, however, reported as saying that territorial battalions had had to be reduced when the existing structure was created, and also as saying: “I do not want to convert the field army (corps de bataille) into commandos. We need both for an effective security force.” (Enclosure to letter from Williams to White, March 2; Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Official Correspondence Jan–Apr 1960 (73))
7. Document 141.
8. Document 167.
9. April 25.
10. According to a document, April 30, entitled “Résumé of the Visit of Admiral Stump with President Ngo Dinh Diem at Dalat 25–26 April 1960”, Diem “told Admiral Stump in confidence that he ‘believed the Embassy people were out to get General Williams.’ The President seemed to be pleading with Admiral Stump to do something to alleviate the situation. Admiral Stump replied forcefully that the record both in CINCPAC and in Washington was well documented in favor of General Williams. The inference here was that the General had absolutely nothing to be concerned about.” This document bears no indication of authorship. Williams apparently was not present at the dinner or the conversation which followed. (Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Conversations with Diem 30 Nov 59–22 Aug 60, (163))
11. Arthur Z. Gardiner.