Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

164. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece¹

Washington, March 2, 1956—4:25 p.m.

2565. You should urgently inform Prime Minister of following US views:

In our opinion chances Cyprus settlement are remote unless Greek Government assumes greater responsibility for achieving understanding on island within next few days. Situation likely to go over to extremists unless Greek Government takes firm and courageous action which Prime Minister indicated he would be able undertake after elections.² Without agreement now emotions will intensify and extremists on island likely seriously impair Makarios influence. Unsettled situation likely to continue unresolved for indefinite future, seriously weakening prestige Karamanlis Government and jeopardizing its chances achieve constructive government program.

US has done everything possible to reconcile opposing views and cannot see anything further it can do to bring about rapprochement of parties primarily concerned. Greek Government should in our opinion assume responsibility and act now if it wishes avert gravely adverse consequences. Although US cannot take official position on British proposals it is our informal view that offer is one which gives Cypriot people possibility of orderly steps toward self-government within framework which may eventually lead to complete self-determination and that Cypriot people should capitalize on present UK offer. It is also our belief that when full explanation of British offer made public in Parliament world opinion will interpret it as generous and enlightened policy in colonial field meeting legitimate claims put forward by Cyprus and by Greece on behalf Cypriot people.

London should inform Foreign Office after Athens reports approach has been made that US has urged Greek Government support for proposals. British should not be told precise line taken in view possibility we might at some later time have suggestions to make to them if some modification position would without impairing essential British interests contribute to settlement.³

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–256. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wood and Baxter. Repeated to London, Ankara, and Nicosia.
2. On February 19, Karamanlis’ National Radical Union won 161 seats of a total 300 in the Greek Chamber of Deputies.

3. In telegram 2378, March 3, Cannon informed the Department that in the absence of the Prime Minister, he had conveyed the points contained in this telegram to the Foreign Minister. Among other things, the Ambassador urged Theotokis to obtain Karamanlis’ permission to make it clear to Makarios that Greece needed to take advantage of every possible improvement in the Cyprus situation. Of the three major differences that had emerged out of the recent negotiations—amnesty, public security, and legislature—Cannon noted the latter was really the most crucial and the one which aroused Greek and Cypriot mistrust. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–356)

   On March 5, Cannon, reporting on what the United States could do to mitigate the consequences of the current break in the Cyprus negotiations, noted:

   “We can also show that problem has been narrowed to few points. In describing these we can help British get Turks off their high horse on crucial demand for “equal” representation. Latter point goes to heart of question since there can be no solution if British continue to let Turks retain their hidden veto over a forthright expression of HMGs true intent.” (Telegram 2395; ibid., 747C.00/3–556)

   In telegram 3733 from London, March 5, the Embassy informed the Department that it had made the approach as indicated in this telegram. The Foreign Office’s only comment was that the Greek Government was taking the same line as Makarios— accusing the British of being intransigent and causing the breakdown of the discussions. (Ibid.)