96. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Hemmendinger) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1

SUBJECT

  • Forthcoming JCS Recommendations on Future Force Levels for the ROK Army

A member of NA has been shown privately a September 6, 1955 letter from General Lemnitzer to the Army Chief of Staff2 presenting CINCFE’s recommendations for future force levels of the ROK Army. Defense, (ISA), has action on it, and it is expected to be acted on favorably by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the near future.

General Lemnitzer says that the military situation in Korea does not require permanent maintenance of a force of twenty active and ten reserve divisions, and recommends a stage-by-stage cut-back, reviewed every six months. The tentative force levels he recommends are: July 1957, twenty active, ten reserve (as at present); January 1958, seventeen active, thirteen reserve; July 1958, thirteen active, seventeen reserve; January 1959, nine active, twenty-one reserve. He says that he requires a lead time of eighteen months to retire a group of divisions, allowing time for locating a site and constructing facilities, and asks for immediate approval of this tentative schedule and approval of the necessary construction funds so that the ROK can be informed of the necessity for some cuts at the earliest possible moment and necessary preparations can be made for an orderly retirement. Presumably General Lemnitzer has in mind notifying the ROK about next January.

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Comment and Recommendation

The Agreed Minute of Understanding of November 1954 states that “…3 as trained reserve strengths are obtained, the total number of active military personnel will be adjusted accordingly.” In negotiating the Agreed Minute it was made clear to the ROK that the United States believed the ROK had neither the manpower nor economic resources to support its present armed forces indefinitely. General Lemnitzer’s recommendation is moderate in terms of its timing and is in line with the Agreed Minute. The only real difficulty that I can see at this time is the furor which will be created in the ROK on announcement of such plans despite their signature of the Agreed Minute.

The JCS4 and Defense are now considering General Lemnitzer’s recommendation and we are not yet called upon for our views. My preliminary thought is to concur in these recommendations but to examine carefully the timing and methods of informing the ROK. Probably it would be best to approach the ROK only on the first stage of the reduction and to do so at the working level where an examination would be made of the manpower resources of the ROK and the status of the reserve program on the assumption that the Agreed Minute establishes the general policy.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/10–2455. Secret. Drafted by Norred on October 21. Also sent to Sebald.
  2. Not printed. (Enclosure to JCS 1776/542; National Archives and Records Administration, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2))
  3. Ellipsis in the source text.
  4. In a November 2 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that they had approved in principle a future reduction in active ROK army forces, but they did not specifically approve the final number of divisions and did not specify the date at which the reduction would be feasible. The Joint Chiefs concluded that conditions in Korea remained sufficiently tense so that “any reduction of forces at this time could cause a deterioration of the Far East situation which would be detrimental to U.S. interest in that area.” (Washington National Records Center, OASD/ ISA Files: FRC 60 B 1025, 091.3 Korea)