92. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State 1

Secun 22. For Secretary from Hoover. Upon arrival Seoul I reviewed thoroughly major aspects Korean situation with Ambassador, General Lemnitzer, Wood, and key members American staff. I was therefore ready when I saw President Rhee to take strong position on major questions at issue between our governments.

However, during entire period interview which lasted over an hour all that President Rhee did was exchange pleasantries and talk in lofty terms of ideals and philosophical problems of modern world. There was no approach to any substantive problem whatsoever.

Lacy states tenor conversation almost completely incomprehensible in light Rhee’s recent actions.2 We can only assume President must have sensed firmness and unanimity which obviously present between all of us on US side.

At large luncheon October 7, I was guest of Yi Ki-bung, Speaker National Assembly, who probably frankest confidant of Rhee. After prior consultation with Lacy I told Yi that I had been most impressed with courteous and sympathetic meeting with President but had been deeply shocked few minutes after leaving him to read excoriating and inflammatory articles in latest editions Rhee’s own newspaper including provocative editorials against US. I said it was most difficult for me to reconcile conflicting attitudes.

Yi appeared greatly worried and we pursued subject no further.

Yi then read speech obviously written for him by someone in Rhee’s immediate entourage complaining that US must change its “weak and vacillating policy of coexistence with Communist bloc.” In brief reply I merely said I was glad have opportunity visit Korea and exchange views with government leaders and that we had come only to learn and listen not to carry on negotiations. I then proposed a toast to President Rhee after which Speaker Yi hurriedly rose and proposed a somewhat embarrassed response to President Eisenhower.

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Later in the afternoon I attended heartening briefing by ROK General Staff on their defense organization. At conclusion Army Chief of Staff General Chong addressed me directly in presence of entire group saying that Korean Army remembers that we trained together, fought together and died together. This produces strong and lasting bond between us. We look to US for guidance and advice. We pledge to US complete loyalty and cooperation of ROK military establishment.

I replied that we were all deeply moved by this presentation; that they could rely upon our support and cooperation and that American people have highest admiration for what ROK Army has achieved and for its courage.

At that time we felt this had no greater significance than exchange amenities. Later in evening, however, Chong told Cameron,3 Embassy First Secretary, that he had intended in his remarks to make a definite point of special relations ROK Army to US and that he wished to convey a real pledge of loyalty of ROK Army to US in contrast to attitude of politicians which he said was damaging ROK-US relations.

In late afternoon I had meeting with American Chamber of Commerce and released statement (Secun 18)4 supporting Embassy stand re local tax situation, placing special emphasis on Department backing of position.

At dinner in evening Rhee was again most courteous and friendly but no substantive issues were discussed.

I am visiting US front with Lemnitzer this morning, returning Seoul shortly before our party leaves for Taipei.

Lacy
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.12–HO/10–955. Secret; Priority.
  2. President Rhee’s resentment of U.S. policy with respect to the hwan-dollar conversion issue, the pace of the withdrawal of the NNITs from South Korea and the consequent demonstrations, and the dispute over the taxation of American businessmen in the Republic of Korea focused on Ambassador Lacy. By the time of the Hoover-Hollister visit to Seoul, Lacy had determined that he could not discharge his responsibilities effectively in such an atmosphere. He therefore asked to be relieved of his responsibilities for reasons of health, and Hoover concurred. In passing the recommendation on to Dulles, Hoover expressed his complete confidence in Lacy. (Telegram 460 from Seoul, October 9; ibid., 123–Lacy, William) Additional documentation on Ambassador Lacy’s situation is ibid. Documentation relating specifically to the taxation question is ibid., 895B.11.
  3. Tumer C. Cameron, Jr.
  4. Secun 18 from Seoul, October 7, transmitted the text of the statement released to the press that day in which Hoover indicated that the United States would continue to work for a fair solution to the business tax dispute. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.12–HO/10–755)