57. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, June 3, 19551

PARTICIPANTS

  • Department of Defense—
  • Admiral Radford
  • Colonel Throckmorton2
  • Department of State—
  • The Secretary
  • The Under Secretary
  • Mr. Phleger
  • Mr. Robertson
  • Mr. McClurkin

Admiral Radford referred to the incoming telegram from General Taylor concerning the equipment which would be introduced into Korea if the restrictions of paragraph 13(d) were removed.3 He said that nothing of this sort was now in contemplation for the Republic of Korea forces although eventually it might be necessary or desirable to give them some of this equipment. He thought that the British proposal4 indicated that they had not fully understood what Defense suggests. Defense had not intended to suspend the reporting provisions or to abolish the NNSC. Rather, Defense wanted to suspend the NNSC until more satisfactory arrangements were made but meanwhile to continue reporting.

In answer to questions from the Secretary he said that the primary objective at the moment was not to put in the new equipment but to get the NNSC teams out of the ROK and into the demilitarized zone. The 13(d) problem could be handled later. He said that this is consistent with the Presidential decision.5

The Secretary said that so far as 13(d) is concerned he could not see that there is a very serious problem. The Armistice was never intended to last forever. The United States should avoid getting caught up in legal maneuvers designed to abolish provisions of the Armistice. Instead we should give a reasonable interpretation to the provisions of the Armistice and simply go ahead and put into Korea the equipment we need to put into Korea and tell the NNSC that we are doing so.

[Page 112]

Mr. Phleger said that the United States could not very well take that action alone but should get the agreement of the Sixteen.

The Secretary said that we should simply inform the Sixteen as to what we plan to do. The basic intent of the Armistice was to maintain military power commensurate with the other side. It is necessary to make a choice between a literal interpretation or a practical interpretation of the Armistice—between the spirit and the letter of the agreement. The Communists are already interpreting it to allow them to put in new models and there is no reason why we should not simply do so, citing the Communists’ example. This is much better than getting into a legal argument or an effort to renegotiate the Armistice.

Mr. Phleger pointed out that it would be necessary to report to the United Nations.

Mr. Robertson said that he was not sure that the Canadians and some of our other allies would be willing to let us go ahead on this basis. He added, however, that if we took some such action with respect to reinforcing material our problem with the ROK would be considerably eased, and we might therefore have less difficulty in coping with their resistance to having NNSC teams stationed in ROK territory.

Mr. McClurkin commented that we would need to tell our allies on a confidential basis exactly what equipment we would plan to put into Korea under this interpretation of 13(d).

It was agreed that Mr. Phleger would prepare a statement of the interpretation of the Armistice which could be made first to the Sixteen and then reported to the United Nations.

It was also agreed that for the present we would not take summary action with respect to the NNSC but would let the NNSC go ahead with the agreed reduction, indicating that this in our view did not solve the problem but that we had no objection to their proceedig with the contemplated reduction.

Robert J.G. McClurkin 6
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6–355. Secret. Drafted by McClurkin. A Department of Defense summary of this conversation was sent by Admiral Radford to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in a June 6 memorandum. (Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 60 A 1025, 387.4 Korea)
  2. Colonel John L. Throckmorton, member of the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
  3. Reference is to telegram C 72805; see footnote 3, Supra .
  4. See Document 51.
  5. See Document 45.
  6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.