54. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State1

1307. For Robertson. Reference: Embtel 1306.2 There follows text of my memorandum to General Taylor, dated May 25, containing our views on political and economic factors relating to proposal force reduction goals for the ROK:

“The Korean military establishment is undoubtedly the strongest single stabilizing force in Korea. It is at the same time a highly significant political factor in the general Far Eastern situation.

“As the strongest Allied military force in the Far East, although by necessity confined to Korea, the ROK Army’s existence is a powerful, if not a determining, factor in shaping Korean relations with Far Eastern countries. It appears also as a goal towards which the other free Asian countries, especially in Southeast Asia, aspire, as we wish them to do. The ROK military establishment is a power factor of great import in the Far East and, as the largest and most effective standing army in the area on our side, will continue to be so for some time. Therefore, a move to reduce its size will have repercussions throughout the Far East. If such a reduction follows a general reduction of tensions in this area, including the withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces from North Korea, the readjustments which would necessarily accompany the reduction could be contained and exploited for the achievement of US policy objectives. If knowledge of proposals looking towards the reduction of the ROK military establishment should precede a general lessening of tensions, the effect in Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines and other Far Eastern countries would be extremely harmful to morale in these countries.

“Within Korea, ROK leaders and especially President Rhee feel that the ROK armed forces should be larger than the contemplated twenty active and ten reserve army divisions. Any suggestion of a reduction below this level would be pure political dynamite here, striking as it would at Rhee’s principal objective, i.e., unification of Korea during his lifetime, and at his fundamental assumption, i.e., that unification can only be accomplished by armed force. Knowledge [Page 105] at this time of plans for a future reduction of the ROK armed forces would make our relations with the ROK Government exceedingly difficult. Our influence in the affairs this country would be seriously reduced, including the restraint we have been able to exercise on the President’s objective of unifying Korea by force. With the removal of this restraint the possibility of a unilateral attack north in presidential dismay and desperation should not be discounted. One of the principal aspects of this restraint has been the relationships which have been built up between American civilian and military officers and individual ROK military leaders. It is extremely doubtful that these relationships would survive in face of armed forces reduction proposals.

“American influence and restraint on ROK civilian and military leaders have also been exercised through the Unified Command. Withdrawal of ROK armed forces from the UNC might be an immediate result of ROK knowledge of plans to reduce those forces, especially if such action was accompanied by a further phase-out of US and other UN forces. (Under these circumstances, the question of the basis for continuing the UNC itself might well be raised.)

“Plans to reduce the ROK armed forces would undoubtedly severely shake ROK morale at all levels of society, especially among ROK leaders. President Rhee could be counted on to react even more vigorously than he did last summer to the phase-out of US forces. At that time we were able to make the point that his overall military position would not be weakened since US divisions would be replaced by accruing ROK strength. In spite of this, withdrawal of US divisions caused a violent reaction. Mention to him of plans for reduction of ROK armed forces even before they have been built up to the promised strength will to President Rhee presage a catastrophe.

“The effect on the stability of the Rhee regime would be very direct since success in obtaining US military assistance has been one of the main sources of the President’s great political strength. The immediate effect of putting into question the stability of the present regime would be political confusion which would be exploited by Rhee’s opponents (including the Communists), none of whom have his stature or appeal in the country. In this connection, the forthcoming Presidential election which will take place probably in the summer of 1956 should not be overlooked. Within the military establishment itself which is, as stated, the strongest single stabilizing force in Korea a reduction in force proposal would have most unsettling effects.

“From a purely economic point of view, there is no question whatever that the Korean military establishment is far larger than the economic resources of the country can support and that even a reduced establishment, say by 50 percent, would require very substantial [Page 106] US assistance and support. This point is axiomatic and requires no elaboration. We are prepared to discount, on Mr. Wood’s advice, the importance of the problem of integrating the released from the army into the civilian economy; Mr. Wood suggested the possibility that the expanding nature of the Korean economy under the aid program would accommodate this accretion to the labor force. Of great importance, however, is the uncertainty and instability which would result from a force reduction proposal. This would undoubtedly have most serious effects on the confidence both of foreign and domestic capital in the future of Korea.

“If international tensions, particularly in the Far East, are reduced to a point which would justify a reduction in the Korean military establishment, there still remains the question of timing and, in this connection, the developments leading up to the Korean Presidential elections in the summer of 1956 and the elections themselves will be crucially important. It may not be too much of an over-simplification to say that, as the situation seems today, the individual nominated to run as candidate for Vice President with Rhee will be of key importance to the achievement of US long range objectives in Korea. A US decision on Korean force goals and the timing of the disclosure to ROK officials might very well be the controlling factor in this selection. These statements are intended to signal this question as one which deserves serious and continuing consideration at the highest levels of our government.

“It is of immediate concern that US representatives in the forthcoming US-ROK economic discussions in Washington should by all means avoid giving the Korean representatives any indication that the US is thinking about a reduction in the ROK armed forces or a further phaseout of US troops below the two division level. Introduction of this subject into the Washington talks would jeopardize the success of these talks. Presumably these talks will coincide with intensified preparations for a Big Four meeting,3 if not with the meeting itself, and we can expect ROK suspicions already being emphasized in official discussions and in the press to increase. Therefore, even if we could discount the political effects of a force reduction described above, we could not expect a rational reaction if the proposal was raised in the Washington talks. At the least, the ROKs would not hesitate to label such a proposal as part of the price the US was prepared to pay during the Big Four negotiations.

“In conclusion, it is essential to US-ROK relations and to the achievement of US objectives in Korea that no suggestion of plans to [Page 107] reduce the ROK military establishment reach ROK officials now. The importance of the timing of the disclosure of this information cannot be over emphasized. When it is decided that conditions in the Far East and in the rest of world justify this step our collective best judgement must be mobilized to determine the most effective way of presenting it to the ROK in the light of conditions existing at the time. On this point one thing seems clear even at this distance, we should avoid being put in the position we found ourselves in when we told only President Rhee of our plans concerning the 1954 phase-out of US troops.”

Lacy
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/5–3055. Top Secret; Priority.
  2. In telegram 1306 from Seoul, May 30, Ambassador Lacy reported that he had been unable to reach agreement with General Taylor on a recommendation concerning the scope of the impending talks between officials of the United States and the Republic of Korea in Washington. General Taylor felt that the question of a reduction in size of the armed forces maintained by the Republic of Korea should be introduced into the economic discussions if the overall economic problems facing South Korea were to be dealt with successfully. Ambassador Lacy and the Embassy staff disagreed. (Ibid., 795B.5–MSP/5–3055)
  3. Apparent reference to the conference that took place in Geneva, July 18–23, 1955, among representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.