Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

53. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Taylor)¹

Washington , May 27, 1955—11:43 a.m.

JCS 982226. From JCS.

1. It is desired to avoid, particularly during the next 2 or 3 months, any incident involving United States and Communist aircraft in peripheral areas. At the same time, there is no desire to defer or restrict air operations required to secure essential military information.

2. It appears from recent experience that USAF fighter patrols flown for general surveillance purposes along the eastern and western coasts of North Korea are a likely cause of such incidents.² There is no question of the basic authority to operate over international waters as long as restrictions regarding approaches to Communist-held territory are observed. However, there is a question of the actual military return obtained from flights of fighter aircraft which closely approach Communist territorial waters and therefore run the risk of involvement with Communist aircraft.³

3. It is directed that operations of aircraft in the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea be so conducted as to minimize involvement with Communist aircraft. It is important to emphasize that this proscription is not designed to inhibit necessary ECM, weather, photographic or shipping surveillance missions, but all flights which have the aspect of baiting Communist fighter aircraft should be avoided.

4. Previous communications which directed fighter escort of essential photographic reconnaissance flights in areas in close proximity to Communist territory continue in effect.

5. If in your opinion this directive would operate to seriously limit your essential military operations, your comments are requested.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795A.5411/6–1455. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to COMFEAF Tokyo, and COMNAVFE Japan.
2. Concern over these patrols in Washington grew out of incidents which occurred on February 5 and May 10. In both cases, U.S. planes flying reconnaissance missions along the coast of North Korea and Manchuria were challenged by MIG aircraft. In the ensuing air battles U.S. planes violated North Korean and possibly Chinese Communist airspace. U.S. officials were particularly concerned to avoid unnecessary incidents along the Chinese coast, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had issued instructions on March 3, 1955, prohibiting aerial reconnaissance within 12 miles of the Korean coasts. (Memorandum from Sebald to Murphy, May 18; ibid., NA Files: Lot 58 D 184, Korea Military)
3. This issue was discussed in a State–JCS meeting on May 20. (Ibid., State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417)
4. In telegram C 72924 from Tokyo, June 11, CINCFE responded that the restrictions outlined in JCS telegram 982226 would not seriously limit essential military operations. (Ibid., Central Files, 795A.5411/6–1455)