Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

52. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)¹

Washington, May 27, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC)

Discussion

Now that the British have replied negatively (Tab A)² to our suggestion that the NNSC be provisionally suspended, it is necessary to consider our next move. The French have not yet replied, but we have an informal indication that they are not favorably disposed toward the proposal.³

The British counterproposed that we (1) accept the proposal by the NNSC for a reduction in its personnel and number of teams as the best solution that can be secured at the moment; and (2) permit the Command, without further declaration, to introduce discreetly such weapons as it believes are necessary. While this proposal goes to the heart of the problem as defined by our military, there is serious doubt about the feasibility of either introducing more modern weapons covertly or interpreting the Armistice so as to give us substantially increased latitude, in view of the interpretations already adopted by the NNSC. Since concealment for any period is impossible, and since we have legal grounds, in view of Communist violations, for suspending the military reinforcement provisions, we would be better off before world opinion if we did so openly rather than covertly.

Nevertheless, a proposal regarding the suspension of the obligations of paragraph 13(d) should be considered if Defense can demonstrate that there would be substantial military advantages in relieving the Command of these reinforcing restrictions of the Armistice. So far Defense, despite repeated requests, has disclosed no specific plans for the introduction of new weapons if the Command were relieved of paragraph 13(d). In a recent message from Seoul (Tab B)⁴ Ambassador Lacy states that it is his understanding that current American military plans in the Far East do not include the provision of modern weapons to the Republic of Korea (ROK) and that abrogation of paragraph 13(d) would not materially affect the current U.S. military program for Korea.

In Tab C⁵ Embassy Seoul previously stated that if necessary “we may be able to live for the time being with the NNSC proposal for reduction in personnel in spite of President Rhee’s dissatisfaction, providing the U.S. continues to work for abolition of the Commission”.

With respect to the proposal to suspend the NNSC operations provisionally, it is questionable whether the military advantages of such action would outweigh the disadvantages of doing so over the objection of our Allies.

Recommendations⁶

1. That Defense concurrence be sought to instruct the United Nations Command (UNC) to state in the Military Armistice Commission that (a) the NNSC proposal is not satisfactory since it does not solve the serious difficulties created for the UNC by the Communists in their obstruction of the operations of this body and by their violations of paragraph 13(d), but that (b) we will accept this proposal provisionally pending a satisfactory solution to this problem.

2. That the Swiss and Swedes be informed of the instruction to the UNC and that we again urge them to find a more satisfactory solution.

3. That when plans for the introduction of new weapons are prepared and ready for implementation the positive support of our Allies be vigorously sought for openly suspending the provision of paragraph 13(d).

4. That the President’s approval to the foregoing courses be sought.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5–2755. Secret. Drafted by Jones; concurred in by IO, EUR, FE, and L/UNA; and approved by McClurkin. Sent through Murphy who initialed it.
2. Not found attached. Apparently a copy of the memorandum and attachment Supra was attached at Tab A.
3. This indication was confirmed by Ambassador Couve de Murville on May 31 when he told Murphy that the French Government felt that the Swiss and Swedish proposal to reduce the number of NNITs in Korea should be supported by the U.N. Command in the Military Armistice Commission. A further effort to eliminate the inspection teams, the French felt, could perhaps be made later. (Memorandum of conversation by Murphy; Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5–3155)
4. Not found attached. A note on the source text indicates that telegram 1254 from Seoul, was attached at Tab B. Telegram 1254 is printed as Document 50.
5. Not found attached. A note on the source text indicates that telegram 1211 from Seoul, May 7, was attached at Tab C. In telegram 1211, the Embassy assessed the recommendation made by General Taylor which is outlined in Document 44.
6. These recommendations were ultimately adopted, but only after extended debate within the government. Regarding Dulles’ decision with respect to the reduction of the NNSC, see Document 81.