Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

50. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State ¹

Seoul , May 17, 1955—6 p.m.

1254. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. With reference para 5, NSC 5514,² there follows Embassy’s current estimate of political advantages and disadvantages of continued compliance with Korean Armistice. This estimate is based exclusively on political considerations and does not treat with military considerations which we recognize may be controlling. Embassy’s political estimate was discussed May 17 with General Taylor who is transmitting through his own channels an estimate of military advantages and disadvantages of continued compliance Korean Armistice.³ General Taylor agreed with us that in any action concerning NNSC or Korean Armistice, the question of timing was of prime importance.

I. Political advantages of terminating compliance with Korean Armistice Agreement:

1. A decision that the U.S. would no longer comply with provisions of Armistice Agreement would materially contribute to improvement of U.S./ROK relations. President Rhee has consistently taken position that Armistice Agreement is an unwarranted and galling interference with ROK sovereignty. A U.S. decision to stop compliance with its terms would be interpreted by Rhee as the achievement of one of his principal objectives. We would expect an improved climate of opinion in Seoul which might make it easier to reach satisfactory solutions to other outstanding problems in U.S./ ROK relations.

2. If the U.S. decision to end compliance with Armistice provisions was implemented by removal of NNSC personnel from ROK territory, danger new incidents involving these personnel would be eliminated. Equally, the possibility of clash between UNC forces and ROK citizens arising out of UNC attempts to protect NNSC personnel would no longer exist.

3. A decision to end compliance with the Armistice would probably make President Rhee even more amenable to maintaining ROK forces under the UNC.

II. Political advantages of continued compliance with Armistice Agreement:

1. The political advantage for US/ROK relations which would accrue from a U.S. decision to stop compliance with the Armistice would, in our opinion, be only temporary. Rhee’s principal objective is unification of Korea in his lifetime. His real objection to Armistice is based upon his belief that this arrangement is an impediment to unification of Korea which he insists can only be achieved by force. He would undoubtedly see the U.S. decision to end compliance with the Armistice as an opportunity to obtain additional military supplies to achieve his objective. In other words, we could expect a series of early requests for large amounts of the most modern weapons and equipment including both jet planes and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. It is our understanding that current American military plans in the Far East do not include the provisions of such supplies to the ROK. In fact, it is understood that the abrogation of paragraph 13d of the Armistice would not materially affect the current U.S. military program for Korea. Therefore, we would have to turn down Rhee’s request for additional armament and equipment without being able at that time to justify such rejections by reference to the Armistice Agreement. As a result, the U.S. and not the Armistice Agreement would become the objective of President Rhee’s irritation. The result might very well be that tensions in U.S./ROK relations would increase to a point beyond which they presently exist.

2. The Armistice and U.S. compliance with its terms have exercised a restraining effect upon Rhee’s objectives of unifying Korea by force. U.S. decision to stop compliance with its terms would undoubtedly be interpreted by Rhee as an indication that the U.S. was in process of modifying its position that Korean unification should only be achieved by peaceful means. This interpretation might very well have immediate significance if military and political situation in rest of Asia deteriorates.

3. Koreans grasped with eagerness the idea of a three-front war in Asia. They saw this as the most likely possibility for assuring U.S. support for unification of Korea by force. As they see it, the U.S. would not be able to withhold support for a drive north if the U.S. had become militarily committed in Formosa area. Recent developments which point away from this possibility have been greeted by Koreans with disappointment and dismay. A decision by the U.S. to end compliance with the Armistice terms would be interpreted by Koreans as firmest evidence so far available that the three-front strategy was still the order of the day.

If as it appears to us here on basis of no very privileged information the U.S. Government has decided to undertake negotiations with the Soviet Union on a broad range of issues affecting world tensions, continued compliance with Korean Armistice terms would appear to contribute towards success of those negotiations. A decision to end compliance with its terms might very well cause our allies to question the sincerity of U.S. intentions with respect to possible negotiations.

4. A U.S. decision to stop compliance with the Armistice Agreement would have very adverse propaganda effects. North Korean propaganda is based on a heterogeneous collection of claims, assertions and insinuations which have no basis in fact. As a result, credibility is low. A decision to end compliance with the Armistice probably would give a factual basis for North Korean propaganda and would lend credibility to their other unfounded assertions. An action of this kind on part of U.S. would be cited as factual proof of Commie contentions that the U.S. seeks international tension and war. The effect of this propaganda, not only in the Far East, but among large segments of Europeans, should not be discounted.

5. In a broader context, the U.S. position in Asia rests in large part upon Asian appreciation that U.S. policy is based on principles, including observance of the pledged word. In Asian minds this sharply distinguishes U.S. policy from power politics of European nations. Continued observance of this policy may be temporarily disadvantageous, but in long run, it gives us strength and obtains for us Asian respect and cooperations.

Lacy

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95/5–1755. Top Secret. Repeated to Tokyo.
2. Document 24.
3. See Document 56.