49. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 13, 19551
SUBJECT
- Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC)
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville, French Ambassador
- Sir Robert Scott, Minister, British Embassy
- Mr. Robert Murphy, G
- Mr. William G. Jones, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA
- Mr. Ward Allen, EUR
Mr. Murphy called in Minister Scott and Ambassador de Murville and in separate conversations explained the President’s suggestion to suspend provisionally the unworkable clauses of the Armistice relating to the operations of the NNSC and the inspection teams on the grounds that clearly inoperative and unworkable provisions of a treaty or agreement may be suspended by either party pending agreement of the signatories upon satisfactory arrangements for making those provisions workable.
Mr. Murphy also stressed the need to do something about paragraphs 13(c) and (d) of the Armistice and expressed the hope that action on the NNSC would be a step in the direction of facing up to the problem posed by Communist violation of the reinforcing restrictions. He explained that the Secretary had discussed the matter with Foreign Secretary Macmillan in Paris and had hoped to be able to discuss the matter with Foreign Minister Pinay. Mr. Murphy requested that urgent consideration be given the President’s suggestion on the NNSC by the French and British Governments and pointed out that we desired to receive their views before discussing the matter with the Sixteen.
Minister Scott said he had seen a copy of a telegram from Macmillan to Eden on the conversations with the Secretary. Macmillan, however, had reported only on the question of paragraphs 13(c) and (d) of the Armistice, and had not mentioned the NNSC. With respect to the former problem, Macmillan had told Eden that in view of the situation created by the Communist violations, if anything were to be done, he saw only two alternatives: that is, either to permit the Command to replace its worn out and obsolete equipment covertly or, and he much preferred this solution, to make a forthright announcement that in view of the Communist violations the UN Command was constrained to announce its intention to replace its equipment as it became obsolete with more modern arms. Minister Scott said the principal difficulty the British found with such action was the problem of public relations and stressed the need for persuasive publicly usable evidence of the extent of Communist violations. Mr. Murphy questioned the need to cite chapter and verse when we were all agreed that the Communists had violated the Armistice, and expressed the feeling that there was a tendency on the part of some of our friends to “sweep the matter under the rug” since the U.S. was, so to speak, “holding the bag”. He stated that this problem was urgent for the U.S. and we were not in a position to have it ignored. By permitting the continuance of the NNSC we were in effect collaborating with the other side to make possible a covering up of Communist violations. While he agreed with Mr. Scott’s statement that there was a tendency to look at the NNSC in the Indochina context, Mr. Murphy pointed out that this cut two ways and that already [Page 96] the Communists had also broken the agreements in Indochina.2
Ambassador de Murville stated that he had received no word from Minister Pinay on discussions relating to the Korean Armistice with the Secretary. In response to the Ambassador’s question, Mr. Murphy said we were primarily concerned at this time with suspending entirely the operations of the Communists in the Republic of Korea by a decision expressed through the UN Command. While the Armistice has no escape clause there is plenty of precedent for declaring a part of an agreement invalid and inoperative until better arrangements had been worked out by both sides. In response to a further question, Mr. Murphy said that reinforcement of the UN Command and ROK troops with modern weapons would not be accomplished at once but that action taken on the NNSC would, we hoped, lead in that direction.
Ambassador de Murville wondered whether this would be the best solution and asked why, if we had a strong case to make on the question of Communist violations, we didn’t make it public? It was pointed out to the Ambassador that a good deal of publicity had been given these violations, but that only through public statements by the Sixteen and through active efforts on the part of each could the problem really be fixed in the public mind.
Stating that it seemed to him we had two worries, first the danger of an incident between the NNSC teams and the ROK, and second, and more importantly, the fact that article 13 was being violated, the Ambassador asked if the proposal already made by the NNSC might not have substantially reduced the danger of an incident. He also wondered if we shouldn’t discuss the matter with the Communist Governments to find a solution. Mr. Murphy pointed out that while implementation of the NNSC proposal would reduce the danger somewhat, it did not by any means eliminate it. As for political discussions with the Communists on a political level, we already had had those at Panmunjom since the Communist military there were in fact political officers.
Both Minister Scott and Ambassador de Murville promised to ask for the views of their Governments on the NNSC as a matter of urgency.