48. Memorandum of Discussion at the 248th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 12, 19551
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–4.]
5. Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea (NSC Action No. 1322;2NSC 55143)
Mr. Anderson said that although this problem had not been scheduled on the agenda, the President had desired to inform the Council of certain developments in connection with the problem presented by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and its inspection teams in Korea. After reminding the Council of the bearing of General Hull’s recent report on this problem,4 Mr. Anderson briefly described the proposal made by the Swiss and Swedes and likely to be agreed to by the Communists, calling for a reduction in the number of inspection teams and the number of personnel on each team. He then explained that General Taylor had not believed that the Swiss and Swedish proposal offered anything like a satisfactory solution to the problem, but had expressed the opinion that the proposal by the Swiss and Swedes presented the United States with an opportunity to propose in the Military Armistice Commission the complete abolition of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, as well as the abrogation of paragraphs 13–c and 13–d of the Korean Armistice Agreement, which prevented either side in the Armistice from bringing in any new matériel or adding any additional military personnel.
Mr. Anderson said that General Taylor’s proposal and recommendation had been the subject of discussion yesterday between the President and representatives of the Departments of State and Defense.5 In the course of this discussion two possible courses of action [Page 93] had emerged. One possible course was unilateral action by the United States to suspend the activities of the NNSC inspection teams while doing nothing about paragraphs 13–c and 13–d of the Armistice Agreement. The second possible course of action was unilateral action by the United States to suspend the activities of the inspection teams and likewise to abrogate paragraphs 13–c and 13–d of the Armistice.
The discussion resulted in a decision by the President to inform Secretary Dulles of General Taylor’s recommendation and of the President’s tentative feeling that it might well be possible for General Taylor to suspend the activities of the inspection teams after Secretary Dulles had consulted with the British and French to ascertain their reaction. Accordingly, today or tomorrow Secretary Dulles would presumably propose to the British and French a suspension of the operations of the NNSC inspection teams in Korea.6 On the other hand, with respect to the abrogation of paragraphs 13–c and 13–d, Mr. Anderson explained that the President believed that such a U.S. move should await fuller consultation with the sixteen countries who represented the United Nations Command allies in Korea. Mr. Anderson went on to point out that these decisions were wholly consistent with existing U.S. policy, and that our policy on Korea would not require revision unless these proposed actions by the United States involved jeopardizing the UN set-up in Korea.
The President then commented that he had in mind merely to have the Council kept informed of these developments. It appeared to him that the UN commander in the field did have the right to suspend the activities of the inspection teams if such activities jeopardized the security of the UNC forces in Korea.
Secretary Humphrey expressed agreement with the President, and went on to ask if the time was not also approaching when we would have to get rid of paragraphs 13–c and 13–d of the Armistice Agreement. The President replied that this might well be the case, but he felt that the State Department was altogether right in not wishing to take any action at this time which could result in jeopardizing the United Nations Command structure in Korea.
Admiral Radford said that he wished to clear up two important points. It was his understanding, he continued, that if General Taylor suspended any further mobile inspections, he could bring the inspection teams into the demilitarized zone and keep them there. Secondly, it was Admiral Radford’s understanding that General Taylor already possessed the authority to refuse any further requests by the Communists for inspection in South Korea.
[Page 94]The President said that in any event it was essential that the Departments of State and Defense have a common understanding as to what we have agreed upon.
Secretary Hoover pointed out his very great doubt whether the British could be expected to do very much about any of these problems until after the conclusion of the general election.7 The President repeated his warning that we must be sure that we know what we are doing. It was desirable to tell General Taylor to go slow on any refusal of further mobile inspections for at least a week or two.
The National Security Council:8
Noted an oral report by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs that the President, after full discussion with the Departments of State and Defense, had (1) requested the Secretary of State to consult with the British and French regarding the provisional suspension of the clauses of the Korean Armistice Agreement relating to the operations of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission’s inspection teams, such action being deemed necessary as a result of Communist obstructions and violations of the Armistice provisions; and (2) indicated that action regarding the provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement with respect to the reinforcement of personnel and equipment (paragraphs 13–c and 13–d) should be deferred, pending consultation with the United Nations Command allies.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on May 13.↩
- Regarding NSC Action No. 1322, see footnote 6, Document 11.↩
- Document 24.↩
- See Document 38.↩
- See Document 45.↩
- For a summary of Dulles’ discussion with Macmillan, see Document 46. Dulles did not discuss the problem with the French while he was in Paris.↩
- Reference is to the British general election of May 26, 1955.↩
- The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1399. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)↩