46. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State1

Dulte 31. Re Tedul 22.2 I talked to Macmillan this morning about Korean NNSC. I described to him present situation in detail whereby NNSC is hamstrung in North Korea by Communists whereas in South they have full access due to our strict observance letter and spirit of Korean armistice. Macmillan did not seem fully aware of situation and said he now understood our problem. He promised to look at it again with view to seeing how NNSC might be appropriately wound up and said he assumed we would keep Makins fully informed of our thinking.

I then said to him we had another serious problem regarding replacement of military equipment in South Korea where we would probably have to cut some corners re letter of Korean armistice. Under present circumstances we cannot replace obsolete military equipment which is no longer in production unless we continue production of obsolete equipment. This was particularly applicable to aircraft. I explained that theory of armistice was that it would be quickly followed by political conference leading to replacement of armistice by some form of agreement. We were now faced with situation of indefinite duration where either we replace obsolete equipment with comparable but modern types or we adhere to strict observance of Korean armistice thus permitting defense posture of South Korea to be very seriously impaired.

Macmillan said he was unaware of this problem but was very sympathetic to it. He compared it to someone’s owning 1939 Ford who wished to replace it with new car but was unable to do so unless Ford started reproducing 1939 models. I said to him that we were faced with two possibilities: One was to void the pertinent armistice provisions and other was to simply go ahead and replace obsolete equipment with more modern types. In fact this was what Communists were doing in North Korea where they were continuously [Page 91] violating agreed equipment levels by the introduction of jet aircraft and other items which had not been in Korea when armistice was concluded. I said I tentatively leaned toward simply replacing obsolete equipment with more modern types but had reached no firm conclusions. Obviously this is a delicate matter. Macmillan concluded by saying he fully appreciated our problem and hoped we would also keep Makins fully informed of our thinking so that we could have solid common approach.

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/5–1255. Secret.
  2. Supra.