Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

252. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, October 30, 1957—4 p.m.

369. Warne and I called on President Rhee this morning to discuss FY 58 aid levels. Finance and Reconstruction Ministers also present.

I told President Rhee I regretted inability to inform him officially of aid program before he read it in press (UP Washington despatch giving full details was received Seoul Oct 26), but that we wished review details with him and ministers. Warne then ran through program as it now stands, and told President Rhee he would work out further details with Song.²

In reply, President Rhee thanked Warne and me for efforts made on aid program, expressed pro forma gratitude for US assistance, although reduced this year, and then launched into extremely bitter anti-American diatribe. He said Korea had followed US lead faithfully and fully (sic),³ but that he had finally and reluctantly concluded US incapable or unwilling lead free world. He described present US policy as “peace at any price,” alleged US ignoring increasing Communist gains, and asserted all would be lost unless Communists stopped immediately. He declared Korea could not exist on US aid and vain hopes and said early reunification was required if Korea is to survive. Instead, he said, US was concentrating on co-existence with Communists and on assisting Japan to Asian dominance. Throughout his discourse there ran vein of resentment at Washington for what he obviously sees as neglect of Korea and disregard his own views.

I let President Rhee speak for some thirty minutes without interrupting, having learned through experience that it is fruitless to reason with him until he has completely unburdened himself, and then began as best I could to refute his assertions. I argued my confidence in US policy, and my personal feeling that we were making progress, although slow, in free world’s struggle against Communism; and assured him that his views were fully weighed by US, but pointed to need to reconcile divergent views of our many friends and allies. I agreed that US policy was based on desire for peace, but only with justice, and endeavored demonstrate that war would not resolve our problems, but rather place intolerable burden of reconstruction and even survival on victorious free world. In conclusion, I argued necessity for compromising allied views and maintaining common front, and attempted return to subject at hand.

Although he had calmed down in course my remarks, it became obvious President Rhee was uninterested in any real discussion of aid program. He came back, in more sober manner, to unification question, and asked what was to be done. I replied I could not offer any single effective step, but said series of actions taken and being taken would I thought be ultimately successful. On UNGA vote on Korea membership,⁴ I referred to Asian abstentions and said I felt ROK might do more to win support these countries. Conversation ended with agreement President Rhee and I would discuss unification question further next week.

There is, of course, nothing particularly new in President Rhee’s views as set forth above, although vehemence and emotion with which they were expressed was in contrast to more realistic attitude which he had assumed in recent past. My assessment is that he will “cool off” somewhat as his attention is distracted by other matters. I do feel, however, that his attitude, as well as preoccupation Korea public opinion (Deptel 1089 June 25 and despatch 145 August 30)⁵ are indications that renewed demonstrations of the obvious (i.e., our continuing efforts for unification) are required. In this regard, I believe it important that discussion Korea question in current GA not appear as pro forma, with problem merely being shelved for another year.

Dowling

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5–MSP/10–3057. Confidential.
2. In Sang Song, Minister of Reconstruction.
3. As on the source text.
4. On October 25, the U.N. General Assembly voted on a report of the Special Political Committee which recommended the admission of the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Vietnam to membership in the United Nations. (U.N. doc. A/3712) The General Assembly voted 51–9 with 21 abstentions to admit the Republic of Korea and 49–9 with 23 abstentions to admit the Republic of Vietnam. (U.N. doc. A/PV.709) Membership for both countries was blocked, however, by the prospect of a Soviet veto in the Security Council.

5. In telegram 1089 from Seoul, Ambassador Dowling proposed that the United States seize the initiative on the issue of Korean unification. He pointed to the impending elections in North Korea as an opportunity to call for “genuinely free elections” under the supervision of UNCURK. Another possible approach, he suggested, would be to agree to an international conference on the Korean problem, if Chinese troops were withdrawn from Korea and the Communist authorities accepted the principle of free elections under U.N. supervision. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6–2557)

   Despatch 145 from Seoul transmitted a summary of editorials and speeches by South Korean officials in connection with the Korean Liberation Day on August 15. The primary theme of the editorials and speeches, according to the despatch, was the necessity of unifying Korea. (Ibid., 995b.61/8–3057)