245. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
SUBJECT
- Meeting State–Defense September 5, 1957
Attached at Tab A2 is the agenda of a State–Defense meeting in Secretary Quarles’ office, attended by Secretary Dulles and at which [Page 506] I represented FE. I believe a summary of some of the points discussed under agenda items 1 and 2 will be of particular interest to you. [Here follows discussion of agenda item I.]
Agenda Item II.
Defense had prepared a draft joint State–Defense message to Ambassador Dowling and General Decker which was brought up for discussion (Tab C).3 The Secretary pointed out, “We are honor bound to keep two divisions in Korea if we make this deal with Rhee.” Secretary Quarles agreed but observed that changing conditions might justify an alteration in our plans and he said that two divisions would certainly be retained in Korea long enough to fulfill our bargain. Then he added: “As long as the situation continues as it does today, we have just got to keep this kind of force in Korea.”
The Secretary then inquired as to whether two more divisions must come out of Europe and Secretary Quarles replied in the affirmative.
Turning to the cable itself, the Secretary thought we should have some caveats in the instruction and that we would have to be more precise on details of modernization of ROK forces. He read the attached cable from Rhee (Tab D)4 which I had given him to emphasize the point. He then called upon me for any observations I had in connection with paragraph 3 sub-section (1).
I pointed out that we would be faced with two problems which related to timing: (1) Since the proposed action could not be kept secret, it was certain that there would be a thorough airing in the General Assembly of the subject in connection with the discussion of our action under Paragraph 13 (d) of the Armistice Agreement; and (2) that we might have an implied obligation to inform the Sixteen Nations. I understood that Secretary Robertson had shown a list of equipment to representatives of the seven nations which still have military forces in Korea but the remainder of the Sixteen Nations were under the impression that no primary atomic weapons were to be introduced into Korea. I observed that the Dutch had raised this question specifically and had been informed that only dual purpose weapons would be introduced for the time being, and that the Dutch had subsequently asked to be consulted before any further steps were taken.
The Secretary raised the question as to how soon it was planned to move these weapons into Korea and presumed that it would take several months. General Lemnitzer answered that we needed them [Page 507] now, that they were all ready for shipment and that it would be merely a matter of weeks once the word was given.
The Secretary observed at a later stage in the meeting, in summarizing State’s position, that the point regarding the debate in the General Assembly did not bother him too much, and that as regards the Sixteen Nations, he turned to me and suggested that we talk with the Dutch.
During the discussion, Secretary Quarles said the Army feels that General Decker should have the latitude of going beyond the current NSC policy in the direction of modernization. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
The Secretary queried if we charged the surplus stock which would be transferred to the ROK forces to the Military Security program, what would the cost be? Secretary Quarles reply was that it would amount to $100 million for the first year. He said the total savings as a result of modernization of our own forces would be $60 million during the same period. He further noted that these savings would be wiped out if General Decker had to modernize the ROK forces further but he added that this, of course, would require additional NSC approval.
The Secretary also raised the question as to what we were now planning to supply Koreans by way of modern weapons. He failed to get a clear answer to this question but General Lemnitzer pointed out that the Koreans were anxious to have M 46 tanks some of which would be surplus to our two divisions, and they want recoilless rifles. If we could supply them with these two items, it would go a long way toward meeting their urge for modernization, he said. Modernization in communications and transportation is a weak reed to lean on in selling Rhee the idea of reducing his forces, he emphasized. The ROK knows that this is already programmed. I asked General Lemnitzer how many tanks presumably could be supplied as surplus from two modernized U.S. Divisions. He said it would probably run in the neighborhood of 50. The recoilless rifles would not come out of surplus.
The Secretary finally agreed to go along in general with the draft joint cable but said he thought it should be more responsive to President Rhee’s request for details. The paragraph on equipment should be expanded and there should be a general caveat which would take us off the hook if subsequently we found it necessary to pull out some of our troops. The Secretary then observed that we have just got to go ahead with this program of reduction of ROK forces. “We are not going to get the kind of money that will enable us to spend around a billion dollars a year in Korea”, he concluded.
- Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 65 D 497, FE 2500–3100. Top Secret.↩
- Not found attached.↩
- Not found attached; for the message as sent, see Document 247.↩
- Not found attached; apparent reference to a cabled copy of Document 238.↩