235. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Korean Ambassador (Yang) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), Department of State, Washington, July 26, 19571
SUBJECT
- Aid Levels and Reduction ROK Army
Ambassador Yang requested an appointment to express his worry about possible cuts in aid appropriations in Congress. He explained that the Korean people are “up in the air” about the matter.
Mr. Robertson responded that he, too, was very much worried, not only with respect to Korea but also in terms of its impact throughout Asia. He added that the United States is helping to support one million eight hundred thousand troops in Asia. These anti-Communist forces represent an important factor in the military balance. Even so, it looks most probable that cuts will be made by the Congress. In this event there is only one way to adjust, and that is to reduce the size of these standing armies. We will want to be sure, however, that such reductions do not reduce military capabilities. The development of nuclear weapons has in fact changed the character of modern defense. However, their cost is astonishingly high. The development of nuclear weapons has given man the power to destroy himself. Mr. Robertson stated that he intends to talk to President Rhee about this matter the next time he sees him. Certainly if there is World War III with nuclear bombs, there would be colossal destruction and the winner will find himself on top of a heap of ruins. This fact may preclude such weapons ever being used.
Mr. Robertson stated that President Rhee must realize the point which was included in the recent exchange of letters with President Eisenhower that there is no way we can continue to furnish the supplies for the present size ROK force. Of course, the decision to reduce the ROK Army lies with the Government of the Republic of Korea. However, with a cut in defense support, a continuation of the present level of ROK forces could have disastrous economic effects in Korea. He explained that we feel that the United States deterrent power, modernization connected with the MAC statement on June 21, 1957,2 the United States-Korean Mutual Defense Treaty and the Joint Policy Declaration of the Sixteen of July 27, 1953 are the real deterrents to Communist aggression in Korea.
We know that the Communists are being strained. Recently, Mr. Khrushchev complained of the drain on the USSR by Communist [Page 476] China. The Communists also know that overt aggression on their part in Korea could lead to all-out war.
Mr. Robertson pointed out that in our judgment a reduction of the Korean Army by four divisions would not make the difference between attacking and not attacking on the part of the Communists in Korea. He further pointed out that the modernization of United States forces is a compensating factor for these reductions. In addition, the savings which would be derived from the reduction of four divisions would be good for the Korean economy.
Ambassador Yang expressed the view that President Rhee would be willing to go along with a cut in the ROK forces if the remainder were modernized in a manner similar to that now being undertaken for United States forces. Mr. Robertson explained that the United States Government is not going to reorganize the ROK Army into pentomic divisions. This is being done for no country in the world. However, there will be some modernization of the Korean forces leading to the introduction of much better equipment.
At this point Mr. Robertson referred to a statement attributed to Ambassador Yang to the effect that Defense officials had promised to modernize the ROK forces with nuclear weapons following the completion of this action for United States forces.3 Mr. Robertson pointed out that this is not the United States policy. Ambassador Yang denied making any such statement.
Mr. Robertson explained that although we were not doing the same for other military forces the type of modernization being undertaken for our own is absolutely essential. Our forces are smaller in numbers in relation to the size and population of the country. Therefore, it is essential that they be the strongest possible.
Mr. Robertson emphasized that President Rhee must realize that our actions and recommendations with respect to the forces in Korea will have the effect of strengthening the defensive position there. Reduction in force levels without weakening the military position, however, will have beneficial effects in the Korean economy.
Ambassador Yang commented that the Koreans do not want to be caught holding obsolete equipment, particularly when the Communists in the north are well-equipped. Mr. Robertson explained that the Korean forces will get much better equipment but we can not do the same as we are doing for the United States forces there.
Ambassador Yang then asked about the prospects for civilian aid. He added that it is impossible for Korea to take such aid on a loan basis. Mr. Robertson commented that the economic aid is before the Congress and we may well have a cut in that, too. With regard to the question of loans, he explained that he has often pointed out [Page 477] Korea’s inability to repay loans. However, if it becomes imperative to put such aid on a loan basis, we will have to work out soft terms in recognition of Korea’s absence of repayment capability.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.5/7–2657. Confidential. Drafted by Parsons.↩
- See Document 225.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 224.↩