Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

233. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Decker) to the Department of the Army ¹

Seoul , July 23, 1957—5:25 p.m.

UK 97747CG (DA IN 40537). DA as Executive Agent, ASD/ISA for Sprague sgd Decker. This message in 6 parts.

• Part 1. References: A. Joint State–Defense Minister Seoul 892² DA 840. B. CINCUNC FE 805587.³ C. CINCUNC FE 805492.⁴ D. DEF 925608.⁵
• Part 2. During a call on ROK Defense Minister Kim Chung Yul on 22 July at which Lieutenant General Jae Hung Yu, chairman, ROK JCS was also present, we discussed the matter of reduction in ROK Forces. Kim agreed that some reduction was desirable if it would result in strengthening the ROK economy, but was concerned over any cut in the forces defending the ROK while the present state of suspended hostilities continues and the communists retain their military capability in North Korea. He stated that President Rhee and the Korean people must be convinced that any reduction in conventional forces will not endanger the security of the ROK. He expressed his willingness to work with the US in developing a plan for a phased reduction in manpower provided some other compensating strength was made available. He requested information as to the modern weapons (meaning atomic capable weapons) which the US would make available to compensate for the loss of ground combat power. I informed Minister Kim that I did not know what modern weapons would be made available to defend Korea, or when they could be expected, but that I would attempt to find out. I assured him that the US was firmly determined to defend ROK in the case of renewed commie aggression and that our deterrent power should be taken into account even though most of it was not located in Korea.
• Part 3. Both Minister Kim and General Yu made the point that it would be necessary to continue US aid at approximately its present level if the force reduction was to be reflected in the Korean economy. I informed them that this could not be guaranteed since I was dependent on congressional appropriations.
• Part 4. When General Lemnitzer discussed this matter with the present Defense Minister’s predecessor, it was suggested that the matter of force reduction be studied jointly by the US Staff and ROK JCS. I have thus far delayed bilateral discussion with ROK JCS pending completion of an estimate of the situation by the US Staff; this estimate⁶ has now been completed. One significant conclusion is that in light of present enemy capabilities a minimum of 21 US/ROK Divisions are required initially for defense of ROK. This will involve certain risks and modification of missions; a reduction below this figure cannot be justified from military considerations. The ROK JCS are also unilaterally studying the possibility of force reduction with contemplated completion date 28 July. I have no information as to the tentative conclusions of this study. Obviously, the results of the US study should not be made known to them if they are to be asked to accept a cut below what the US study concludes is a valid requirement. Furthermore, it seems pointless to enter into any bilateral discussion until knowledge is available here as to US plans to provide an acceptable substitute for the proposed loss in ground power. Such information must be quite specific as to type and time to be made available if it is to be used advantageously.
• Part 5. In my opinion, if information as to US plans can be furnished the Defense Minister it will be possible to develop jointly with him a plan for a phased reduction in present forces which he will recommend to the President. Conversely, without it, the possibilities of obtaining agreement are not promising. There is no assurance that President Rhee will accept a cut even if recommended by his Defense Minister. However, to obtain the support of the latter, if possible, appeared to be the most logical procedure.
• Part 6. It is requested that information concerning US plans and which is releasable to ROK officials be furnished me at the earliest practicable date.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2). Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC, CINCUSAR-PAC, CGUSARJ/UNCEA, and Ambassador Dowling in Seoul.
2. Document 223.
3. In telegram FE 805587 from CINCUNC, June 29, General Lemnitzer noted that the proposed U.S.–ROK joint studies and planning for force level reductions would probably take several months to complete. He therefore questioned plans to designate him as a special representative of the Secretary of Defense to remain in Korea and oversee the planning effort. Lemnitzer argued that to do so would undercut the position of General Decker as CINCUNC after July 1. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2))
4. See footnote 2, Document 224.
5. Not printed.
6. Not found.