Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

229. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Lemnitzer) to the Department of the Army¹

Tokyo, June 30, 1957—3:45 p.m.

FE 805592. For Sec Def for ASD/ISA sgd Lemnitzer. References: A. State Dept msg Tokyo 2830 17 Jun 57,²NOTAL(S). B. FE 805314, 9 Jun 57,³NOTAL(S).

1. With respect to provisions of reference A, which states that the modernization program for Korea will “not include at this time weapons [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] such as Honest John and the 280-mm cannon,” attention is invited to para 4, Ref B.⁴ Had hoped that no restrictions whatsoever would be imposed upon the introduction of modern military equipment into the Republic of Korea following suspension of para 13d of the Military Armistice Agreement.

2. I am deeply concerned by the wide press coverage emanating from the United States which indicates a U.S. intention to withhold atomic capable weapons from the Republic of Korea at this time.

3. The Military Armistice Agreement provided for maintaining the relative military balance of the two sides pending a political settlement in Korea. Relief of the United Nations Command (UNC) from compliance with the restrictions contained in the provisions of paragraph 13d permits the UNC to correct the imbalance created by continued Communist violations of the Military Armistice Agreement.

4. In the case of the Republic of Korea, I believe that action to restrict the introduction of weapons is politically and militarily unsound, particularly when such action is publicly announced outside U.S. military channels. Such announcements will greatly increase the difficulties faced by the UNC in its dealings with the ROK particularly since President Rhee cannot be convinced of the logic of such a restriction.

5. I cannot, of course, object to a directive provided me through military channels which prohibits the transfer of the Honest John or 280-mm gun to Korea. I do object, however, to the public announcement of such restriction in the press.⁵ The intelligence value to the Communists of such announcements is obvious.

6. Furthermore, President Rhee and other officials of the Government of the Republic of Korea, based on information they see in the press and receive from Washington (probably through Ambassador Yang), have come to believe that there are severe reservations on the part of the United States to providing the optimum modernization of US/UN Forces in the ROK. This causes them deep concern and will complicate the already difficult problem of obtaining the Government of The Republic of Korea’s agreement to a reduction of the ROK Armed Forces, as they consider any reduction in forces to be completely dependent on a program of modernization of their forces which is acceptable to the ROK.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2). Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC, Ambassador Dowling in Seoul, and Ambassador MacArthur in Tokyo.
2. Telegram 2830 to Tokyo summarized the briefing given British, Commonwealth, French, Thai, and Turkish representatives on June 17 concerning the U.S. decision to equip U.S. forces in Korea with more modern weapons. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/6–1757)
3. In telegram FE 805314 from CINCUNC, an Ad Hoc Korean Armistice Team, sent to Korea by the Department of Defense to report on the extent of the problem posed by Communist violation of the Armistice Agreement, concurred with General Lemnitzer’s view that abrogation of the limitations imposed by paragraph 13d was urgent. The team also transmitted a draft statement for use in the Military Armistice Commission to accomplish the recommended abrogation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2))
4. In paragraph 4 of telegram FE 805314, General Lemnitzer noted his concurrence with the draft statement proposed by the Ad Hoc team “provided it does not impose restrictions upon the introduction of modern military equipment into the Republic of Korea.”
5. In telegram 300645z from CINCPAC to CNO, July 4, Admiral Stump concurred with General Lemnitzer that “publicity in this case is the essence of evil causing difficult and undesirable relationships between the US and ROK govt.” Stump also agreed “wholeheartedly” that restriction of the introduction of modern weapons was politically and militarily unsound. He argued that “no single step to improve our military posture and to deter the communists from resuming hostilities could be more important at this time than to eliminate any fetters (including those self-imposed) which preclude the introduction of weapons into Korea.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2))