218. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State 1

SUBJECT

  • Modernization of United States Forces in Korea

In accord with NSC Action 16952 and General Cutler’s memorandum of April 4,3 consultations were held with representatives of the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, France, Turkey and Thailand to ascertain their views on equipping United States forces in Korea with weapons on the list discussed in the NSC.

In presenting the problem and the desire to introduce these weapons, I also outlined a proposed plan (Tab B)4 on timing and public presentation should the decision to do so be made. This proposed plan included (1) a statement in the Military Armistice Commission, no later than July 1, 1957,5 pointing out that Communist violations relieve the United Nations Command from continued observance of paragraph 13(d) while redressing the military balance and (2) a report to the United Nations prior to August 1.

The response of the Embassy representatives was sympathetic, with general agreement that modernization of United States forces in Korea should be undertaken. The following are their principal observations upon advice of their governments:

1.
It is desirable that the maximum possible publishable evidence establishing the Communist violations of paragraph 13(d) of the Armistice be presented.
2.
It was the unanimous hope that it would be made clear that the United Nations Command firmly intends to continue to support the Armistice as a whole and to observe the cease-fire.
3.
Any action should best be taken as far in advance of the next session of the United Nations General Assembly as possible.
4.
Australia, New Zealand and France were particularly anxious that no dual-purpose weapons be given the Koreans. All countries [Page 440] requested consultation, should the United States at some future date desire to furnish such weapons to Korea.

If a decision favorable in principle to providing United States forces in Korea with dual-purpose weapons be reached, it is highly desirable that it be announced in the Military Armistice Commission well in advance of July 1, 1957:

1.
This would provide maximum opportunity for any world reaction to the MAC announcement to die away before the next UN General Assembly meeting and permit submitting the report to the UN as far in advance as possible of the General Assembly meeting.
2.
This would enable Ambassador Dowling and General Lemnitzer to begin negotiations for ROK force reductions as part of a package which would include the strengthening of United States forces with dual-purpose weapons prior to the departure of General Lemnitzer, who is being replaced as CINCUNC July 1, 1957.

In view of the lack of opposition among those of our Allies thus far consulted, and the timing factors involved, I believe we should push toward National Security Council reconsideration of the Korean paper (NSC 5702/1) at the earliest possible date so that in the event a decision favorable to providing United States forces in Korea with dual-purpose weapons is reached, the steps incident to its implementation may be gotten under way prior to July 1, 1957.

With respect to the bracketed portions of NSC 5702/1,6 I suggest that we offer to substitute for “[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] will not be stored in Korea” under paragraph 9(a) the following language: “The decision as to whether and when [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] should be stored in Korea will be made by the President after consultation between the Secretaries of State and Defense.” I believe we can agree to the deletion of the bracketed portion of paragraph 19(a) and would further propose the alteration of 19(b) to read: “In view of the necessity to present a convincing public case and to retain the support of our principal Allies in the face of inevitable and continuing Communist, and probably neutralist, propaganda maneuvers, the timing and method of public presentation of the announcement and introduction of dual conventional nuclear weapons under paragraph 9(a) shall be determined by the Secretaries of State and Defense taking into consideration the views of our principal Allies.”

Recommendations:

1.
That you request early National Security Council reconsideration of NSC 5702/1 with a view to reaching a decision on the Korean weapons problem.
2.
That our representative at the Planning Board be authorized to propose the language suggested above for the bracketed portions of paragraph 9(a) and 19(b) and agree to delete the bracketed sentence in paragraph 19(a) of NSC 5702/1.7
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6–557. Secret. Drafted by Nes and cleared with L, EUR, IO, and FE.
  2. See footnote 12, Document 212.
  3. In this memorandum, Cutler summarized the discussion on Korea by the NSC on April 4. (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up)
  4. Not found attached; apparent reference to the talking paper summarized in footnote 3, Document 216.
  5. In telegram FE 805272 from Tokyo, June 5, General Lemnitzer pointed to what he saw as the danger that the Chinese and North Koreans might seize the initiative on the question of paragraph 13d, and he urged that the UNC decision to suspend the provisions of paragraph 13d be announced in the Military Armistice Commission no later than June 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2))
  6. See footnotes 3 and 5, Document 205.
  7. Assistant Secretary Bowie also addressed a memorandum on the same subject to the Secretary on June 5. Bowie reiterated his opposition to the introduction of dual-purpose weapons into Korea, and stated, as his opinion, that the United States should limit itself to the replacement of obsolete equipment in Korea with current models as necessary. There is no indication of the Secretary’s reaction to Robertson’s or Bowie’s recommendations. A copy of Bowie’s memorandum to the Secretary is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, Korea, US Policy Toward (NSC 5702, 5702/1, 5702/2).