Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

216. Record of a Meeting, Department of State, Washington, May 16, 1957¹

Washington, May 16, 1957

SUBJECT

• Modernization of United States Forces in Korea

PARTICIPANTS

• Embassies
• United Kingdom—
• Sir Harold Caccia, Ambassador
• Mr. A.J. de la Mare, Counselor
• Canada—
• Mr. S.F. Rae, Minister
• Mr. J.R. Maybee, First Secretary
• Australia—
• Sir Percy Spender, Ambassador
• Mr. M.R. Booker, Counselor
• New Zealand—
• Sir Leslie Munro, Ambassador
• Mr. G.D.L. White, Counselor
• Mr. N.V. Lough, First Secretary
• State
• Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
• Colonel John M. Raymond, Acting Legal Adviser
• Mr. William Leonhart, NSC Planning Board Assistant, S/P
• Mr. John W. Hanes, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary, IO
• Miss Elizabeth A. Brown, IO
• Mr. John W. Jones, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
• Mr. William T. Nunley, United Nations Adviser, EUR
• Mr. Howard L. Parsons, Director, NA
• Mr. David G. Nes, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA
• Defense
• General Nathan F. Twining, Joint Chiefs of Staff
• Mr. Mansfield B. Sprague, Assistant Secretary, OSD/ISA
• Mr. Robert Deckert, General Counsel
• Captain W. C. Mott

Mr. Robertson, referring to the previous meeting on this subject, April 23, 1957,² during which the problem of modernization had been presented, said that he now wished to propose for consideration an outline plan as to the timing and presentation should it be decided to introduce new weapons into Korea. Such a plan had been requested by the Commonwealth representatives at the last meeting. Mr. Robertson then read from a talking paper (copy attached).³

Ambassador Caccia opened the discussion of the proposed plan by saying that as the Department knew, the British Government viewed the problem sympathetically, and wished to be as helpful as possible. According to all indications, the British Government would be able to go along with the procedure suggested but would hope that the following points could be met:

1. In any public presentation, detailed material should be presented to substantiate a charge of Communist violation of paragraph 13(d) of the Armistice.

2. The United Nations Command should make it clear that it had no intention of denouncing the Armistice as a whole.

3. With respect to timing the United Nations should be informed by an official report as soon after the Military Armistice Commission announcement as possible and the full Sixteen should be informed of the action contemplated before the announcement, as should the Swedes and Swiss.

Mr. Robertson expressed the view that each of these points was, in fact, covered in the plan outlined or paralleled the Department’s ideas as to the proper procedure to be followed. The Department planned to consult France, Turkey, and Thailand and to notify the full Sixteen, together with the Swiss and Swedes, of the decision and plans for implementation prior to any public announcement.

Ambassador Munro said he was in substantial agreement with Ambassador Caccia’s remarks but, in particular, desired express assurances that the ROK forces would not be given any dual-capable weapons. He, furthermore, would not like any impression given that the idea was to match Communist violations. With respect to the language of the draft plan, he did not like characterizing the Communist violations as “striking at the very heart of the Agreement.” This made it appear that the ultimate intention was to abrogate the Armistice as a whole. He would hope also that the report to the United Nations could be transmitted much earlier than August 1. With respect to notifying the other Allies, Ambassador Munro pointed out the difficulty of differentiating between Allies. In conclusion, he asked whether the U.S. was thinking of a simultaneous reduction in ROK forces.

Responding to Ambassador Munro’s points, Mr. Robertson assured him that no consideration was being given to atomic weapons for the ROK forces. We were thinking in terms of a reduction of ROK forces which was one of the purposes of providing U.S. forces with new weapons. Reaching agreement with the ROK might take some time, however. At this point, Mr. Sprague said that it was the hope of Defense to begin negotiation with the ROK immediately following the Military Armistice Commission announcement with a view to reducing their forces, but that agreement would take time. Continuing in reply to Ambassador Munro Mr. Robertson, referring to more extensive consultation with the Allies, said that he wished to make it clear that the U.S. had no intention of submitting the issue to the United Nations for permission to go ahead, thus enabling a veto by those who have no stake in Korea.

Ambassador Spender voiced general agreement with the proposed plan. Pointing out that in 1953 the Armistice Agreement was designed to freeze the status quo, he suggested that this be so stated rather than relying solely on the idea of “preserving the military balance.” With respect to the final paragraph of the proposed Military Armistice Commission statement, he questioned the language used since it seemed to imply much wider suspensions of obligations than merely under paragraph 13(d). Supporting Ambassador Caccia, Ambassador Spender said that this was essentially an exercise in public relations and that it was extremely important to prove the breach. Finally, Australia could never countenance giving dual-purpose weapons to the ROK forces. In response to Ambassador Spender, Mr. Robertson said that, subject to approval by the lawyers, he was perfectly agreeable to a change of language suggested for the final paragraph of the proposed Military Armistice Commission statement.

Mr. Rae, speaking informally, confirmed that the Canadian Government understood the problem, was sympathetic toward the United Nations Command position, and also wished to be helpful. He was in full support of the feeling of his colleagues that it was essential that specific documentation of Communist violations be made public. Also, he thought it advisable that the United Nations Command reaffirm its adherence to the cease fire. Would it not also be desirable for the United Nations Command to state that it had no intention of increasing its forces above the 1953 level? The Canadian Government would also wish to know whether the United Natioins Command intended to continue to submit reports to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Finally, had any thought been given to the possibility of renegotiating paragraph 13(d) with the Communists?

Mr. Robertson agreed that it would be desirable to make it clear that the United Nations Command intended to continue to abide by the cease fire. The United Nations Command could not, however, give assurances that its forces would not be increased unless the Communists gave like assurances. With respect to renegotiating a part of the Armistice, such a course was unthinkable. The Communists still held American prisoners in China, in violation of all their agreed undertakings; 450 American soldiers remain unaccounted for. Of the four principal provisions of the Armistice, namely a cease fire, exchange of prisoners, maintenance of the military balance, and a political settlement, the Communists had refused to adhere to three. Only with respect to a cease fire had they performed their obligation under the Armistice. What advantage would there be in making a new agreement to replace one which the Communists had flagrantly violated?

A discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of continuing to report to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission followed. Mr. Deckert expressed the view that it was not the intention of the U.S. Government to continue to report and that in being relieved of its obligations under paragraph 13(d) by the Communist violations of the paragraph, reporting responsibilities were included. Captain Mott said that some thought had been given reporting perhaps in more general terms. General Twining expressed the view that Admiral Radford did not wish to be bound by reporting. Mr. Deckert pointed out that should reporting continue, the Communists would have a propaganda opening. Mr. Robertson said he had always felt that in suspending obligations under paragraph 13(d), reporting was included.⁴

In response to Ambassador Munro’s request, Mr. Robertson agreed to give the Ambassadors present copies of the proposed plan. He also assured them that the text of any Military Armistice Commission statement would be provided in advance of its presentation at Panmunjom.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5–1657. Secret. Drafted by Nes.
2. See Document 213.
3. Not printed. According to the talking paper, Robertson explained that the Senior U.N. Command Representative in the Military Armistice Commission would make a statement at Panmunjom, no later than July 1, in which he would review Communist violations of the Armistice Agreement and draw the conclusion that, in view of Communist violations of paragraph 13d, the U.N. Command considered that it was entitled to be relieved of corresponding obligations under the Armistice until the relative military balance was restored and the Communist side had demonstrated a willingness to comply with the provisions of the Armistice. To restore the military balance, the U.N. Command intended to replace existing weapons with new weapons currently available. In so doing, however, the UNC did not intend to start an arms race, would deploy new weapons only for defensive purposes, and intended to observe all provisions of the Armistice Agreement other than those from which it was relieved by Communist violations of the agreement. The Unified Command would transmit a full report on the action to the United Nations no later than August 1.
4. On June 21, on the same day that General Litzenberg announced in the MAC that the U.N. Command would no longer consider itself bound by paragraph 13d of the Armistice Agreement, General Lemnitzer reported in telegram FE 805482 from CINCUNC that his view was that relief from the obligations under paragraph 13d should “automatically” include relief from any further reporting on controlled combat matériel. On June 24, telegram DEF 925153, a joint State–Defense message for Lemnitzer and Dowling, was sent to Tokyo and Seoul concurring in Lemnitzer’s view that it was no longer necessary to report under paragraph 13d. Copies of both telegrams are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2).
5. On May 20, Robertson covered the same ground in a discussion with Thai Ambassador Pote Sarasin and Turkish Chargé Ilhan Savut, and in a separate discussion with French Chargé Jacques Vimont. These discussions were summarized in telegram 3785 to Bangkok, May 20, which concluded with an assessment of the Thai, Turkish, and French reactions: “Both Thai and Turkish representatives expressed understanding situation. Former observed emphasis should be on Communist violations rather than production difficulties replacing old equipment. French expressed opinion world would understand U.S. action taken as response Communist violations but would want to be assured that U.S. not going beyond Communist actions as to character of items to be introduced. French indicated would obtain Government’s reaction soon as possible.” (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/5–2057)